Juridical sociologies. Law and society from 1814 to the 1920s

为什么法律这个话题在社会学中起着核心作用？为什么今天不再是这样了？本研究从19世纪初开始，通过对私法法学和社会学相互参照的谱系调查，解释了社会学对法律兴趣的这种转变。正是在私法法学中，德国历史学派发展了将法律与社会的关系问题化的方法，这不仅涉及法律理论，而且涉及法律教条和方法论。在此基础上，对法律话语的支配性分析可以得出三种问题化的方式：关于德国历史学派的辩论中的“代表性的支配性”，其中法律在社会的充分代表性问题上受到质疑；《民法典》（BGB）社会任务之争中的“功能支配”，法律对-à-vis社会的调节功能受到威胁；最后，20世纪初关于方法的争论中的“规范性决定”（normative dispositive），即司法判决中的规范性评价如何能够得到科学证实的问题，导致了法理学与社会学在“应当”与“是”的区别上的分歧。这三种将法律与社会的关系问题化的模式，在社会学的出现中找到了自己的方式，这可以从Émile涂尔干、马克斯·韦伯和费迪南德Tönnies的社会学项目中看到范例。他们每个人都关注于确定法律与社会之间关系的一种可能性：类似于“表征的支配性”，迪尔凯姆承认法律中的集体意识；Tönnies关注法的排序功能，他的社会学最终是针对“社会问题”发展一种新的法哲学；韦伯可以被归为“规范性的决定者”，因为在他所有的方法论著作中，他都在与法律科学的认识论关系作斗争。与法律话语的接近——迪尔凯姆、Tönnies和韦伯的“司法社会学”——导致了社会学与法学分离的必要性。在他们的结论中，这三位作者在法理学的否定中做出了转变，最终导致了社会学对法律的丧失。这一历史研究指出，在法律与社会关系的问题化过程中，人们可以在这一点上进行干预，以使法律再次成为社会学的研究对象。

Why did the topic of law play a central role in sociology as it emerged? And why is this no longer the case today? The present study explains this transformation of the sociological interest in law by means of a genealogical investigation of the mutual references of the jurisprudence of private law and sociology, starting from the beginning of the 19th century.It was precisely in the jurisprudence of private law that the German Historical School developed ways of problematizing the relationship between law and society, which concerns not only legal theory but also legal dogmatics and methodology. On this basis, a dispositive analysis of legal discourses can be used to work out three such ways of problematizing: the ‘dispositive of representation’ in the debates about the German Historical School, in which law is problematized over the question of the adequate representation of society; the ‘dispositive of function' in the dispute about the social task of the Civil Code (BGB), in which the regulatory function of law vis-à-vis society is at stake; and finally, the 'normative dispositive' in the dispute over methods at the beginning of the 20th century, in which the question of how the normative evaluation in judicial judgments can be scientifically substantiated leads to a divorce between jurisprudence and, in particular, sociology on the difference between ‘ought’ and 'is'.These three modes of problematization of the relation between law and society find their way into sociology as it emerges, as can be seen paradigmatically in the sociological projects of Émile Durkheim, Max Weber and Ferdinand Tönnies. Each of them focuses on one possibility of determining the relationship between law and society: analogous to the ‘dispositive of representation’, Durkheim recognizes in law the collective consciousness; Tönnies focuses on the ordering function of law, and his sociology ends up by developing a new philosophy of law in view of the 'social question'; Weber can be assigned to the ‘dispositive of normativity’, since in all his methodological writings he struggles with the epistemological relationship to legal science.The proximity to legal discourses - the 'juridical sociologies' of Durkheim, Tönnies and Weber - results in the necessity of a separation between sociology and jurisprudence. In their conclusions, these three authors make shifts within the jurisprudential dispositives which ultimately lead to the loss of law for sociology. This historical study identifies the point in the problematization of the relationship between law and society at which one can intervene in order to make law addressable again for sociology.