The community is more important than the individual: Deliberation, practical rationality, and moral psychology in Cicero's De officiis

西塞罗对伦理问题的看法是由对个人与社会之间关系的强烈兴趣形成的。不仅是他的政治著作，其中一个主要关注的问题是强调，在怀疑的情况下，社区-特别是保留地-比个人更重要。关于共同体优先的这一论点是我们对西塞罗总体前景的描述的核心特征。然而，令人惊讶的是，从来没有人研究过T对他的伦理理论究竟意味着什么。这就是我的项目进来。我的目的是提供一个系统的调查，在西塞罗最有影响力的伦理学著作《论官》中，共同体的优先权所扮演的角色。我将不只是分析T在"关税计算"中所履行的功能，即在特定情况下确定什么行为是适当的程序。我还将讨论T在《论职务》中所联系的实践理性和道德心理学的概念。这为我们对这部著作的描述增加了一个重要的方面，这部著作虽然在伦理学史上有着巨大的影响，但在今天大多数人都把它当作斯多葛学派的哲学来源来阅读。我思考的出发点是一个没有得到应有关注的观察：T并不容易融入西塞罗在其伦理学中提到的幸福主义框架。Eudaimonism的核心问题是什么对我们的幸福最有贡献，也就是说，什么符合我们自己的利益。相反，T似乎要求我们忽略这个问题，而是优先考虑社区的利益。严格来说，这个问题并不新鲜。它已经存在于亚里士多德，其彻底的eudaimonist伦理学包含的想法，它可以是正确的牺牲自己的生命为别人，例如，当行使勇气。然而，虽然亚里士多德试图调和自我牺牲的情况下，他的eudaimonism，这是不太清楚的De officiis。事实上，我将证明，在这里我们发现了T的另一种非幸福主义基础的元素，它的标志之一是命令和服从的心理以及故意的自我限制。通过探索这些元素，并带来了紧张的eudaimonist框架，我的项目提供了一个全新的观点De officiis。因此，我们不仅可以更好地理解《论公务》对西塞罗所追求的自身利益的贡献，例如，在政治著作中。我们也有一个基础来反思De officis和eudaimonist传统之间的关系，一方面，现代义务论概念，另一方面。这样的反思也是我的项目的一部分。

Cicero’s perspective on ethical questions is shaped by a strong interest in the relationship between the individual and the community. One of the major concerns of not just his political writings is to emphasise that in case of doubt the community – especially the res publica – is more important than the individual. This thesis of the priority of the community (T) is a core feature of our picture of Cicero’s general outlook. Surprisingly, however, it has never been investigated what exactly T means for his ethical theory. This is where my project comes in. My aim is to offer a systematic investigation of the role that the priority of the community plays in De officiis, Cicero’s most influential work on ethics. I will not just analyse the function that T fulfils in the ‘calculation of duty’, i.e. the procedure of determining what behaviour is appropriate in a specific situation. I will also discuss the conception of practical rationality and moral psychology that T is connected with in De officiis. This adds an important aspect to our picture of a work which, though of great influence in the history of ethics, is today mostly read as a source for the philosophy of the Stoics.The starting point of my reflections is an observation that has not gained the attention it deserves: T does not fit readily into the eudaimonist framework that Cicero refers to in his ethics. Eudaimonism centres around the question of what contributes most to our happiness, i.e. what is in our own interest. T, by contrast, seems to ask us to ignore that question and instead give priority to the interests of the community. Strictly speaking, this problem is not new. It is already present in Aristotle, whose thoroughly eudaimonist ethics contains the idea that it can be right to sacrifice one’s own life for someone else, e.g. when exercising courage. Yet while Aristotle tries to reconcile the case of self-sacrifice with his eudaimonism, this is less clear in De officiis. In fact, I will show that here we find elements of an alternative, non-eudaimonist grounding for T, which is marked, among other things, by a psychology of command and obedience as well as deliberate self-restriction. By exploring those elements and bringing out the tension to the eudaimonist framework, my project offers a whole new view on De officiis. Thus, we can not only better understand what De officiis contributes to Cicero’s own interests as pursued, e.g., in the political writings. We also have a basis for reflections on the relationship between De officiis and the eudaimonist tradition, on the one hand, and modern deontological conceptions, on the other. Such reflections are also part of my project.