Contemporary Issues on the Regulation against Abuse of A Dominant Bargaining Position

很多人说，禁止滥用议价支配地位的规定是独特的日本式规定。首先，议价的主导地位并不意味着在市场上的主导地位。它包含了交易关系特定情况下产生的不对称议价能力。其次，滥用行为并不意味着反竞争行为。它包含剥削行为。有一段时间，我们对议价优势地位没有理论解释。最近，一些经济学家将其解释为拖延问题或后契约机会主义。在这个研究项目中，我们接受这个观点。但我们坚持认为，监管是为了保护有限理性各方的合理预期。通常，议价优势地位是指缔约双方之间的议价能力，但它包含了市场上的议价优势地位。为了从这一角度分析议价优势地位，我详细阐述了一种市场力量分析方法。其次，我表明虐待应该包含剥削性和排他性。一些滥用行为具有这两种特征。因此，我们应该接受这两种观点，以适当地规范支配地位的滥用。

Many people say that the Regulation against abuse of a dominant bargaining position is unique Japanese-style Regulation. In the first place, a dominant bargaining position dose not mean a dominant position in a market. It contains asymmetric bargaining power caused by the transaction-relationship specific situations. In the second place, abusive conducts dose not mean anti-competitive conduct. It contains exploitive conduct. At one time, we had no theoretical explanation for a dominant bargaining position. Recently some economist explains it as a case of hold-up problem or post-contractual opportunism. In this research project, we accept this perspective. But we insist that the regulation works for the protection of the reasonable expectations of bounded rational parties. Usually a dominant bargaining position means a bargaining power between contracting parties, but it contains dominant position in the market. In order to analyse a dominant bargaining position in this perspective, I elaborate a method of market power analysis. For the second place, I shows that the abuse should contain both exploitive and exclusive. Some abusive practice have both traits. So we should accept both perspective in order to regulate abuse of a dominant position properly.