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Development of Corporate Reorganization and Reform of Merger Control

公司重组与并购控制改革的进展

基本信息

批准号：
15530039
负责人：
YAMABE Toshifumi
金额：
$ 1.92万
依托单位：
Hitotsubashi University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2003
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2003 至 2004
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/en/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-15530039/
关键词：
merger and acquisition merger control market power creation or strengthening of market power substantial restriction of competition external growth performance-based competition test of competition 市揚支配的地位企業の内部的成長市場競争のテスト寡占的市場支配 /

项目摘要

The purpose of this research is to reexamine the principle of merger control of Antimonopoly Law, in order to regulate appropriately mergers of huge undertakings which are increasing recently. The problems are chiefly taken up in the article of "A note on some basic problems regarding merger control". The article is a summary of the result of the research in 2003 fiscal year.From the standpoint of competition law and policy, the creation or strengthening of market power by merger is undoubtedly anti-competitive, and such a merger should be prohibited. Affording market power is the one of the principal bases for controlling mergers, but it is insufficient for theoretic basis of the regulation. If creation or strengthening of market power in itself should be condemned, creation or strengthening of market power by internal growth of an undertaking grounded on performance-based competition should be also condemned as well as by external growth, i.e. merger. The law, however, does not prohibit creation or strengthening of market power by internal growth. Mergers create enlargement of scale and/or scope of the merging firms. But the enlargement does not rest upon performance-based competition. Mergers invite the growth of merging firms without the test of competition at the market of goods or services. Mergers might also be regarded negatively as a method of competition, and this might be another principal and theoretical basis for merger control. For that reason, it is not necessary to take the improvement in efficiency, which is brought about by expansion of scale and/or scope of business of the merging firms, into consideration for merger control. In addition, about the substantive regulation standard, it is clarified that proof of concrete progress of use of market power has been required.The subsequent result of the research is due to be published in November 2005 or later.

本文的研究目的在于重新审视反垄断法的合并控制原则，以期对近年来日益增多的大型企业合并行为进行适当的规制。这些问题主要在“关于合并控制的一些基本问题的说明”一文中讨论。本文是对2003年度研究结果的总结，从竞争法和竞争政策的角度来看，通过合并创造或加强市场支配力无疑是反竞争的，应该禁止。市场势力是规制企业合并的主要依据之一，但它不足以作为规制企业合并的理论依据。如果市场支配力的形成或加强本身应受到谴责，那么，企业以基于业绩的竞争为基础，通过内部增长以及外部增长，即兼并，来形成或加强市场支配力，也应受到谴责。然而，法律并不禁止通过内部增长创造或加强市场力量。合并扩大了合并企业的规模和/或范围。但这种扩张并不依赖于基于业绩的竞争。合并促使合并公司的成长，而不需要在商品或服务市场上进行竞争。合并也可能被视为一种消极的竞争方法，这可能是合并管制的另一个主要理论基础。因此，合并管制没有必要考虑合并企业扩大规模和/或业务范围所带来的效率提高。此外，关于实质性规制的标准，明确规定了必须证明市场支配力的具体运用进展。今后的研究结果将于2005年11月以后公布。