Japanese Banking Behavior and Financial System Architecture from Behavioral Economies' Viewpoint

本研究主要探讨以下三个议题：第一，明确考虑银行监管者的职业考量，分析银行监管的无效率。与现有研究的主要区别在于，我考虑了银行监管机构考虑自己的声誉以及社会福利的情况。本研究的主要结论是，银行监管者的职业关注不仅会导致宽松的监管政策，也会导致严厉的监管政策。其次，从理论上分析了日本银行业信息生产能力下降的原因。本文的理论假设是，银行管理层的过度自信和自利归因偏差使日本银行不愿提供信息。第三，对个人投资者的行为进行了实证分析。本研究首先回顾了前人关于性格倾向效应存在的研究。其次，利用日本个人投资者的交易记录，实证证明了日本个人投资者存在处置效应。

This research investigates the following three topics.First, the inefficiency of bank regulation is analyzed by considering bank regulators' career concerns explicitly. The main difference from existing research is that I consider the situation that bank regulators take into account their own reputation as well as social welfare. The main conclusion of this research is that bank regulators' career concerns generate not only generous regulatory policy but also severe policy. Furthermore, I indicate the some untested empirical implications.Second, I analyzed theoretically why the ability of information production by Japanese banks declined. The theoretical hypothesis is that overconfidence and self-serving attribution bias of bank management make Japanese banks reluctant to produce information.Third, the individual investors' behavior is analyzed empirically. In this research, I reviewed previous research on the existence of disposition effect. Next, using trading records of Japanese individual investors, I show the empirical evidence that support the existence of disposition effect on Japanese individual investors.