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Coordination of Interests and Bank Behavior

利益与银行行为的协调

基本信息

批准号：
12630094
负责人：
MISUMI Takashi
金额：
$ 0.96万
依托单位：
Hitotsubashi University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2000
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2000 至 2001
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-12630094/
关键词：
behavioral economics behavioral finance prospect theory mental accounting bad loan problems historical cost accounting market value accounting 企業救済信認サンク・コスト

项目摘要

Bank behavior is investigated by considering bank managements' preference explicitly, The main difference from existing research is that I consider bank managements as agents with various cognitive biases in making decision, not as homo economicus.Standard economics has assumed that economic agents are rational and markets are efficient. However, there have been various empirical evidences that are inconsistent with this assumption. These studies, called 'behavioral economies' or 'behavioral finance,' apply achievement in cognitive psychology.In this research project, I reviewed research in behavioral economics and behavioral finance, in which I considered the relationship between economics/finance and psychology.Next, I considered 'bad loan problems,' the most serious economic problems in Japan, from behavioral economies' viewpoints. In this research, I considered the behavioral pattern of Japanese banks in the face of bad loan problems under the bank managements subject to prospect theory and mental accounting. In particular, I analyzed following issues ;(1) Why do Japanese banks hesitate to disclose and liquidate their bad loans?(2.). What is the impact of accounting standards - historical cost accounting vs. market value accounting - on writing-off of bad loans?(3) Why is infusion of such a huge public funds useless in resolving bad loan problems?I concluded that my model of bank behavior, which assumed biased bank managements, was very useful in considering Japan's bad loan problems.Behavioral economics/finance is thought to be promising approach to money and banking issues. The research result in this project is a first step to the understanding of Japanese banking system from the behavioral economics/finance viewpoints.

银行行为的研究是在明确考虑银行管理层偏好的基础上进行的。与现有研究的主要区别在于，我把银行管理层看作是在决策时具有各种认知偏差的代理人，而不是经济人。然而，有各种经验证据与这一假设不一致。这些研究被称为“行为经济学”或“行为金融学”，是运用认知心理学的成果进行的研究。在本研究中，笔者回顾了行为经济学和行为金融学的研究，思考了经济学、金融学与心理学之间的关系。接下来，笔者从行为经济学的角度，思考了日本最严重的经济问题--“不良贷款问题”。在本研究中，我考虑了在前景理论和心理会计的银行管理下，日本银行面对不良贷款问题的行为模式。具体分析了以下几个问题：（1）日本银行为什么不愿意披露和清算不良贷款？（2.）。会计准则-历史成本会计与市场价值会计-对注销不良贷款有何影响？(3)为何注入如此庞大的公帑，对解决坏帐问题毫无用处？我的结论是，我的银行行为模型，假设有偏见的银行管理，是非常有用的考虑日本的不良贷款问题。行为经济学/金融学被认为是有前途的方法来解决货币和银行问题。本课题的研究成果是从行为经济学/金融学的角度理解日本银行体系的第一步。