Coordination of Interests and Bank Behavior

利益与银行行为的协调

基本信息

批准号：
12630094
负责人：
MISUMI Takashi
金额：
$ 0.96万
依托单位：
Hitotsubashi University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2000
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2000 至 2001
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-12630094/
关键词：
behavioral economics behavioral finance prospect theory mental accounting bad loan problems historical cost accounting market value accounting 企業救済信認サンク・コスト

项目摘要

Bank behavior is investigated by considering bank managements' preference explicitly, The main difference from existing research is that I consider bank managements as agents with various cognitive biases in making decision, not as homo economicus.Standard economics has assumed that economic agents are rational and markets are efficient. However, there have been various empirical evidences that are inconsistent with this assumption. These studies, called 'behavioral economies' or 'behavioral finance,' apply achievement in cognitive psychology.In this research project, I reviewed research in behavioral economics and behavioral finance, in which I considered the relationship between economics/finance and psychology.Next, I considered 'bad loan problems,' the most serious economic problems in Japan, from behavioral economies' viewpoints. In this research, I considered the behavioral pattern of Japanese banks in the face of bad loan problems under the bank managements subject to prospect theory and mental accounting. In particular, I analyzed following issues ;(1) Why do Japanese banks hesitate to disclose and liquidate their bad loans?(2.). What is the impact of accounting standards - historical cost accounting vs. market value accounting - on writing-off of bad loans?(3) Why is infusion of such a huge public funds useless in resolving bad loan problems?I concluded that my model of bank behavior, which assumed biased bank managements, was very useful in considering Japan's bad loan problems.Behavioral economics/finance is thought to be promising approach to money and banking issues. The research result in this project is a first step to the understanding of Japanese banking system from the behavioral economics/finance viewpoints.

通过明确考虑银行管理人员的偏好来调查银行行为，与现有研究的主要区别在于，我认为银行管理是在做出决定方面具有各种认知偏见的代理人，而不是作为同性恋经济性的经济学。但是，有各种经验证据与这一假设不一致。这些研究称为“行为经济”或“行为财务”，在认知心理学中应用成就。在这项研究项目中，我回顾了行为经济学和行为财务研究的研究，在这些研究项目中，我考虑了经济学/金融与心理学之间的关系。我考虑了“不良贷款问题”，我认为“不良贷款”，日本最严重的经济问题，是从行为经济学的角度来看。在这项研究中，我考虑了日本银行的行为模式，面对不良贷款问题，但在前景理论和心理会计的情况下。特别是，我分析了以下问题；（1）为什么日本银行犹豫透露和清算其不良贷款？（2。）。会计标准的影响 - 历史成本会计与市场价值会计 - 对不良贷款的写入是什么？（3）为什么在解决不良贷款问题的情况下注入如此庞大的公共资金无用？我得出结论认为，我的银行行为模型（假定银行管理的模型，假定银行管理，在考虑日本不良贷款问题方面非常有用，考虑到了日本的不良经济。该项目的研究结果是从行为经济学/财务观点理解日本银行体系的第一步。