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A Experimental Study of Auditing Effectiveness

审计有效性的实验研究

基本信息

批准号：
15530308
负责人：
KATO Tatsuhiko
金额：
$ 0.9万
依托单位：
Meiji University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2003
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2003 至 2004
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

The aim of this research is to examine how far the information transmission through the audit purchase works between a manager and investors. We propose a simple model based on signaling and cheap talk games. What we try to do is to demonstrate to what degree the audit unreliability will be acceptable and how much the environmental change affects the audit credibility. We also examine how the different audit purchasings costs influence the behavior of investors and managers. It predicts that the higher the audit purchasings cost is, the easier is it to obtain the separating equilibrium, in which any manager who makes no effort no longer purchases an audit. We also investigate it in two laboratory settings, first in two laboratory markets ; whether auditing is available or not, second in three markets : whether auditing is unavailable or available but at two different audit purchasings costs. In both experiments managers in the market where auditing available have chosen much more effort than where auditing unavailable. Investors in the former market have invested more often than in the latter. It shows that the managers give much trust to the audit purchase, despite of investors doubt about its reliability. In the second experiment, contrary to our prediction, investors invest less often at the high audit purchasings cost. Managers also make an effort less frequently. They try to cheat more often the investors, who turn out to be defensive and refrain from the investment. Perhaps managers find too high the total incremental costs of inducing trust on the part of the investors. They thus want to spare the cost of effort or audit purchase. Facing with this alternative, what they have chosen is to cut down on the former, more essential one. That causes investor's defections.

本研究的目的是探讨透过审计购买的资讯传递在经理人与投资人之间的作用。我们提出了一个基于信令和廉价谈话游戏的简单模型。本文的目的是论证审计不可靠性在多大程度上是可以接受的，以及环境变化对审计公信力的影响程度。我们还研究了不同的审计购买成本如何影响投资者和管理者的行为。研究表明，审计购买成本越高，越容易达到分离均衡，即任何不努力的管理者都不再购买审计。我们还调查了它在两个实验室设置，首先在两个实验室市场，审计是否可用，第二个在三个市场：审计是否不可用或可用，但在两个不同的审计购买成本。在这两个实验中，在审计可用的市场中，管理者比在审计不可用的市场中选择了更多的努力。前一个市场的投资者比后一个市场的投资者更频繁。这表明，尽管投资者对审计购买的可靠性表示怀疑，但管理者还是对审计购买给予了很大的信任。在第二个实验中，与我们的预测相反，投资者在高审计购买成本的情况下投资较少。管理者也不那么频繁地做出努力。他们更经常地试图欺骗投资者，结果投资者变得防御性强，并避免投资。也许经理们发现，获得投资者信任的总增量成本太高了。因此，他们希望节省工作或审计购买的成本。面对这种选择，他们选择的是削减前者，更重要的一个。这就导致了投资者的流失。