A theoretical and empirical Study on international coordination of Intellectual Property Rights

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We investigate the effect of intellectual property rights(IPR) on the outcome and welfare through licensing in duopolistic firms with patented two complementary technologies. We explore a condition on the extent of enforcement of IPR and the litigation cost of the infringer firm under which inefficient/ efficient social surplus of monopoly/duopoly realizes.Next, we construct a three country trade model composed of two (one developed and another developing) exporting countries' firms and one importing country. With licensing of developed country's firm technology with IPR, exhaustion of IPR and litigation for infringement of her IPR, we derive a sub game perfect Nash equilibrium.Then, we examine how parallel import influences pharmaceutical innovation and the whole welfare, when cross national drug price differentials occur not only because of demand elasticity based factors, but governmental drug price control based factors. By explicitly considering the governmental drug price control based factors, we show that parallel import may enhance pharmaceutical innovation, under some conditions on the bargaining power of a foreign government and the price elasticity of demand in the foreign market. We also show that the increase in R&D induced by parallel imports may even increase the consumer surplus of a country with high demand elasticities and which could face relatively low drug prices, if parallel imports were not allowed.Finally, we derive the effect of enforcement of IPR on the equilibrium outcome and welfare through unilateral and cross licensing decisions in duopolistic firms with patent. two complementary technologies. We find the conditions on both the imitation cost of the infringer and the probability of the accuser firm winning the lawsuit under that a unilateral licensing/ a cross licensing may be contracted between them, and efficient social surplus of duopoly realizes.