A theoretical and empirical Study on international coordination of Intellectual Property Rights

知识产权国际协调的理论与实证研究

• 批准号: 16530179
• 负责人: OKAMURA Makoto
• 金额: $ 1.6万
• 依托单位: HIROSIMA University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2004 至 2005
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/en/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-16530179/
• 关键词: Licensing; international coordination of intellectual property rights; Complementary technology; Litigation cost; Exhaustion; Parallel Import; Drug Price Control; 技術開発; 価格介入; ライセンス契約; ナッシュ的交渉; Litigation cost; ブランダー・スペンサーモデル

We investigate the effect of intellectual property rights(IPR) on the outcome and welfare through licensing in duopolistic firms with patented two complementary technologies. We explore a condition on the extent of enforcement of IPR and the litigation cost of the infringer firm under which inefficient/ efficient social surplus of monopoly/duopoly realizes.Next, we construct a three country trade model composed of two (one developed and another developing) exporting countries' firms and one importing country. With licensing of developed country's firm technology with IPR, exhaustion of IPR and litigation for infringement of her IPR, we derive a sub game perfect Nash equilibrium.Then, we examine how parallel import influences pharmaceutical innovation and the whole welfare, when cross national drug price differentials occur not only because of demand elasticity based factors, but governmental drug price control based factors. By explicitly considering the governmental drug price control based factors, we show that parallel import may enhance pharmaceutical innovation, under some conditions on the bargaining power of a foreign government and the price elasticity of demand in the foreign market. We also show that the increase in R&D induced by parallel imports may even increase the consumer surplus of a country with high demand elasticities and which could face relatively low drug prices, if parallel imports were not allowed.Finally, we derive the effect of enforcement of IPR on the equilibrium outcome and welfare through unilateral and cross licensing decisions in duopolistic firms with patent. two complementary technologies. We find the conditions on both the imitation cost of the infringer and the probability of the accuser firm winning the lawsuit under that a unilateral licensing/ a cross licensing may be contracted between them, and efficient social surplus of duopoly realizes.

本文研究了具有两种互补专利技术的双寡头企业中，知识产权通过许可对产出和福利的影响。本文探讨了垄断/双头垄断的无效率/有效率社会剩余实现的条件，即知识产权执法的力度和侵权企业的诉讼成本。接下来，构建了一个由两个（一个发达国家和一个发展中国家）出口国企业和一个进口国企业组成的三国贸易模型。通过对发达国家企业的知识产权技术许可、知识产权用尽和知识产权侵权诉讼，推导出一个子博弈完美纳什均衡，并考察了在需求弹性和政府药品价格控制因素共同作用下，平行进口对药品创新和整体福利的影响。通过明确考虑政府药品价格控制的因素，我们表明，平行进口可能会促进医药创新，在一定条件下的讨价还价能力的外国政府和国外市场的需求价格弹性。我们还表明，增加的R&D引起的平行进口，甚至可能会增加消费者剩余的高需求弹性的国家，这可能会面临相对较低的药品价格，如果平行进口是不允许的。最后，我们得出的影响，知识产权执法的均衡结果和福利，通过单边和交叉许可的决定，在双寡头企业的专利。两种互补的技术。我们发现了在双方可能签订单边许可/交叉许可协议的情况下，双寡头垄断的有效社会剩余实现的条件，即侵权方的模仿成本和原告企业胜诉的概率。

项目成果

Parallel Trade, Pharmaceutical Innovation, and Intellectual Rights

平行贸易、医药创新和知识产权

• 发表时间: 2005
• 期刊: Working Paper Series, Kobe City University of Foreign Studies No.0018
• 作者: 田畑顕;岡村誠;新海哲哉;田中悟
• 通讯作者: 田中悟

An Analysis on Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Licensing and Welfare, (in Japanese)

知识产权执法、许可和福利分析（日语）

• 发表时间: 2005
• 期刊: The Journal of Social Science (Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo) vol.56, Nos.3・4
• 作者: Tetusya Shinkai;et al.
• 通讯作者: et al.

ライセンス契約、国際貿易、消尽および知的財産権の行使

许可协议、国际贸易、知识产权用尽和执行

• 发表时间: 2005
• 期刊: 経済学論究 59。2
• 作者: 新海哲哉;田中悟;岡村誠
• 通讯作者: 岡村誠

国際貿易と知的財産権制度の理論的分析

国际贸易与知识产权制度理论分析

• 发表时间: 2005
• 期刊: 経済学論究(関西学院大学経済学部紀要) 59巻2号
• 作者: 新海哲哉;田中悟;岡村誠;田畑顕
• 通讯作者: 田畑顕

A Note on licensing of complementary technologies and enforcement of intellectual property rights, (in Japanese)

关于补充技术许可和知识产权执法的说明（日语）

• 发表时间: 2004
• 期刊: The Journal of Economics of Kwansei Gakuin University vol.58, No.3
• 作者: Tetusya Shinkai;et al.
• 通讯作者: et al.