Rules on takeovers and takeover defenses in Japan

本文从法经济学的角度对日本的收购行为和反收购制度进行了研究。我们的主要结果如下两个。第一个是关于在日本使用“毒丸”的收购防御。家田隆指出，考虑到日本的法律和经济制度，这种收购防御往往是过度防御。本研究包括理论研究和案例研究两部分，特别是日本放送公司的收购抗辩。饭岛博嗣研究了信息不对称条件下的合意规则，这在以往的文献中是没有考虑的。这项研究包括，例如，投标报价规则，强制投标规则，两级报价的各种规则。

We investigate rules on takeover activities and takeover defenses in Japan from viewpoints of Law and Economics. Our main results are following two. The first is on takeover defenses using "poison pills" in Japan. Takashi Ieda shows that takeover defenses of this type can often be excessive defense considering Japanese law and economic system. This investigation includes both theoretical and case study, in particular takeover defenses of Nippon Broadcasting SystemThe second is on rules on takeover activity. Hirotsugu Iijima investigates desirable rules under asymmetric information, which is not considered in the previous literature. This study includes, for example, the Tender Offer Rule, the Mandatory Bid Rule, various rules on two tier offers.