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Influence which the Securities Exchange Act System Has on the Acquisition of Corporate Control and the Action After Acquisition

证券交易法制度对公司控制权的取得及收购后行为的影响

基本信息

批准号：
13630022
负责人：
IIJIMA Hirotsugu
金额：
$ 0.32万
依托单位：
Nagoya University of Commerce and Business Administration
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2001
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2001 至 2002
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

By this paper, we consider asymmetrical information problem in merger and acquisition, and examin the desirable regulation system under such circumstances.Generally, there are two kinds acquisition of control block of shares. One is the take-over bid and another is stock purchase in a market. Since a take-over bid makes the same all stockholders' trading conditions in sale of control, it has regulated the merger and acquisition which is done by the stock purchase in a market in Britain and Japan. On the other hand, the United States does not have this kind of regulation, and relief of this regulation is considered by Japan now.Though it is easy to mention theoretically the advantage of the rule (it is called a take-over bid buying-over rule) which forces it a take-over bid, the predominance of the rule (it is called a market dealings coexistence rule) which accepts market dealings is difficult for finding out. The predominance of a market dealings coexistence rule, is shown by precedence research, this is restricted to the situation that a huge controlling stockholder who has veto in buying over exists.This paper newly considered the asymmetrical information problem that a stockholder did not understand a fixer's type, and found out the predominance of a market transactions coexistence rule. (It comes out, even if it, of course, does not assume existence of a huge controlling stockholder.) It was also shown that the predominance of a market dealings coexistence rule becomes strong in the situation which can be interpreted as the present condition of Japan.

本文考虑了并购中的信息不对称问题，并探讨了这种情况下应采取的监管制度。控制权收购一般有两种类型。一种是要约收购，另一种是在市场上购买股票。由于要约收购使所有股东在出售控制权时的交易条件相同，因此对英国和日本市场上通过股票购买方式进行的并购进行了规范。另一方面，美国没有这种规定，日本现在正在考虑解除该规定。虽然理论上很容易提及强制收购要约的规则（称为要约收购规则）的优势，但接受市场交易的规则（称为市场交易共存规则）的优势却很难找出。市场交易共存规则的优越性，是通过先例研究得到证明的，这仅限于存在具有收购否决权的大控股股东的情况。本文重新考虑了股东不了解操纵者类型的信息不对称问题，找出了市场交易共存规则的优越性。（当然，即使不假设存在巨大的控股股东。）也表明，在可以解释为日本现状的情况下，市场交易共存规则的主导地位变得很强。