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Robust Framework Design for Electric Power Market with Supply Stability

供应稳定的电力市场稳健框架设计

基本信息

批准号：
17560752
负责人：
TEZUKA Tetsuo
金额：
$ 2.18万
依托单位：
Kyoto University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2005
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2005 至 2006
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

The deregulation trend in the electric power market since 1980's is partly due to the anticipation that introducing a pool market boosts the power companies' competitiveness and also lowers the electricity prices. Through California Electricity Crisis, however, it has been well understood that a pool market principle sometimes leads to the investment circumspection and the resultant price fluctuation. In general, power companies in the locally-monopolized market can easily invest in power-generation plants so as to meet the power demand, and the deregulation of the power industry inevitably makes the investment more risky. Furthermore, there have been invented no rules for making sufficient incentives in strategic investment. Stabilization of the power supply under the deregulated power market is an important requirement for the deregulated framework of the power market.This study aims to develop a simulation model of the deregulated power market and to propose the design method for the appropriate market rules that can stabilize the power prices. The market mechanism for the liberalized market needs to stabilize the market under variety of decision-making algorithms of stakeholders. However the strict market rules prevent stakeholders from joining the trading. The proposed design method may avoid the undesirable unstable behavior under the prepared decision-making algorithm-sets. The market rules are decided so that the desirability indicator such as the stability of the market price may be maximized. The decision-making models for plant-investment have been made through experimental economics method. And the desirable rule sets have been investigated based on the simulation-based simulation methods. The effectiveness of the proposed method was demonstrated through the simulation study.

20世纪80年代以来电力市场的放松管制趋势部分是由于预期引入联营市场可以提高电力公司的竞争力并降低电价。然而，通过加州电力危机，人们已经充分认识到，联营市场原则有时会导致投资谨慎和由此产生的价格波动。一般来说，在本地垄断市场下，电力公司很容易投资兴建发电厂，以应付电力需求，而电力行业的撤销规管，无可避免地令投资的风险增加。此外，还没有发明任何规则来对战略投资进行充分的激励。电力市场下的电力供应稳定是电力市场框架下的一个重要要求，本文旨在建立电力市场的仿真模型，并提出能够稳定电价的市场规则的设计方法。自由化市场的市场机制需要在利益相关者的各种决策算法下稳定市场。然而，严格的市场规则阻止利益相关者加入交易。所提出的设计方法可以避免不希望的不稳定行为下准备的决策算法集。市场规则的决定，使可取性指标，如稳定的市场价格可以最大化。运用实验经济学方法建立了设备投资决策模型。基于仿真的仿真方法，研究了理想规则集。仿真研究表明了该方法的有效性。