A new prospect of fisheries resource management by applying a game-theoretic approach

应用博弈论方法探讨渔业资源管理的新前景

• 批准号: 17580155
• 负责人: YAMAKAWA Takashi
• 金额: $ 1.22万
• 依托单位: The University of Tokyo
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2005
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2005 至 2006
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/en/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-17580155/
• 关键词: game theory; fish stock; fishery management; cooperative game; Nash equilibrium; pooling system; income allocation; tragedy of the commons; 競争

We developed and proposed the concept of a non-cooperative pooling system as a new fisheries management system to remedy the "tragedy of the commons" and evaluate its management performance by applying a game theoretic approach. This system shares the pooled income according to a certain sharing rule which is intended to achieve the desirable Nash equilibrium for the pre-agreed objectives, such as the conservation of decreased stock. By using such a framework, we can modify the payoff function among the fishermen and internalize the external diseconomy of the fishery. We evaluated its robustness and flexibility compared with three other fisheries by changing the factors such as price conditions etc. The non-cooperative pooling system enhances the long-term income and conserves the spawning stock biomass and can readily respond to a variety of factors by changing the value of the tuning parameters in the sharing rule. Although there remains much scope for improvement for practical use, the concept of this system has potential to contribute to the attainment of sustainable fisheries management.

我们开发并提出了一个新的渔业管理制度，以弥补“公地悲剧”的非合作联营系统的概念，并通过应用博弈论的方法来评估其管理绩效。该系统根据一定的分享规则来分享汇集的收入，该规则旨在实现预定目标的理想纳什均衡，例如减少库存的保护。利用这一框架，我们可以修正渔民之间的支付函数，并将渔业的外部不经济性内部化。通过改变价格条件等因素，我们评估了其鲁棒性和灵活性与其他三种渔业相比。非合作联营系统提高了长期收入，保护了产卵种群生物量，并可以通过改变共享规则中的调整参数的值来随时响应各种因素。虽然在实际应用方面仍有很大的改进余地，但这一系统的概念有可能有助于实现可持续渔业管理。