共通鍵暗号の精密解析に関する研究

公用密钥密码精确解析研究

• 批准号: 15K16004
• 负责人: CHEN Jiageng
• 金额: $ 2.25万
• 依托单位: Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• 财政年份: 2015
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2015-04-01 至 2016-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/en/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-15K16004/
• 关键词: cryptanalysis; lightweight block cipher

1. To implement robust and secure pseudo-random number generators (PRNG) is a challenging issue for low-cost Radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags. In this first research, we study the security of LFSR-based PRNG implemented on EPC Gen2 tags and exploit LFSR-based PRNG to provide a better constructions. We provide a cryptanalysis against the J3Gen which is LFSR-based PRNG and proposed by Sugei et al. for EPC Gen2 tags using distinguish attack and make observations on its input using NIST randomness test. We also test the PRNG in EPC Gen2 RFID Tags by using the NIST SP800-22. As a counter-measure, we propose two modified models based on the security analysis results. We show that our results perform better than J3Gen in terms of computational and statistical property.2. Integral attack can be considered as the deterministic version of the statistical saturation attack,which works by tracing the properties of the integral sets after certain rounds of encryption.In this second research, we provide the first study on how to take advantage of the integral attack and apply it to cryptanalysis by using statistical approach. One of our contributions is to firstly apply the internal collision of a set as the evaluated statistics and show how this property can be efficiently propagated in the General Feistel Structure (GFS) with bijective map S-Box. Secondly, we provide a simple statistical framework to evaluate the data complexity. Finally, we evaluate several GFS and find out for some of the designs, our approach provide a better result compared with other statistical attack.

1. 实现鲁棒、安全的伪随机数发生器（PRNG）是低成本射频识别（RFID）标签面临的一个挑战性问题。在第一项研究中，我们研究了基于LFSR的PRNG在EPC Gen 2标签上实现的安全性，并利用基于LFSR的PRNG提供更好的构造。针对Sugei等人提出的基于LFSR的PRNG算法J3 Gen，使用区分攻击对EPC Gen 2标签进行了密码分析，并使用NIST随机性测试对其输入进行了观察。我们还使用NIST SP 800 -22测试了EPC Gen 2 RFID标签中的PRNG。作为对策，我们提出了两个修改模型的基础上的安全性分析结果。我们的结果表明，我们的结果表现优于J3 Gen的计算和统计属性。积分攻击可以看作是统计饱和攻击的确定性版本，它通过跟踪加密后的积分集的性质来进行攻击，在第二个研究中，我们首次研究了如何利用积分攻击，并将其应用于密码分析中。我们的贡献之一是首次应用内部碰撞的一组作为评估统计，并显示如何此属性可以有效地传播在一般Feistel结构（GFS）与双射映射S-Box。其次，我们提供了一个简单的统计框架来评估数据的复杂性。最后，我们评估了几个GFS和发现的一些设计，我们的方法提供了一个更好的结果相比，其他的统计攻击。