A RESEARCH ON THE ROLES OF PERCEPTION IN PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY

感知在柏拉图哲学中的作用研究

• 批准号: 07610006
• 负责人: MAGATA Tadamichi
• 金额: $ 1.22万
• 依托单位: KOBE UNIVERSITY
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 1995
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 1995 至 1997
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-07610006/
• 关键词: paradeigma; puzzle of induction; anamnesis; dialektike; perception vs.universal; khoriste idea; intuitive grasp; hypokeimenon; 先言措定(ヒュボケイメノン); anamnesis; elenchos; dialektilce; a priori; G.Vlastos; Bodu-Addo; aisthesis; tithenai ta phainom

It is almost universally accepted that Plato rejects perception to attain knowledge (episteme) which is of unique, unchanging and transcendent objects, i.e. Forms (Ideai, Eide). But Plato maintains at the same time as follows : the notion that the objects of senses have deficiency compared to the Forms does not occur to us except by sight or touch or one of the senses. (Phdn.75a) This passage suggests that perception is a necessary condition to the cognition of Forms.In order to reveal Plato's view of perception, I traced in the Earlier Socratic Dialogues the method of the example (paradeigma) and the inductive reasoning (epaktikoi logoi) which are attributed to Socrates by Aristotle. In these dialogues Plato usually makes Socrates to start argument from daily experiences and common opinions to atain definitions of ethical terms. In the procedure Plato seems to have encountered a puzzle concerning investigation, i.e. 'In order to attain a universal, we must collect examples of the same … More kind, but in order to collect examples of the same kind, we must already have obtained the universal idea.'To solve the puzzle Plato introduces the theory of recollection (anamnesis) in the Middle Dialogues. The interpretation which I suggest is that the famous experiment of anamnesis with a slave boy in the Meno is intended to show the empirical development of understanding concerning the concept of '2', and that the fundamental of dialectic (dialektike) is revealed in the process of the experiment. This is against the interpretation of G.Vlastos who argues the experiment is to show the innate ability of logical reasoning independent of sense experience.I reconstructed the procedure of dialectic in the Phaedo and the Republic, and made clear the role of opinion, experience, and perception. Especially at the moment of perception was grasp some general feature of objects. Though obscure it may be, this is the starting point (arche) of dialectic to grasp Forms. This function of perception is investigated in a later dialogue, the Theaetetus. The 'hypokeimena' of Aristotle is a legacy of Plato's voyage of speculation on the relation between knowledge and perception. Less

柏拉图拒绝知觉以获得具有唯一的、不变的、超越的对象即形式的知识（知识型），这一点几乎被普遍接受（理念，艾德）。但柏拉图同时坚持如下：感觉对象与形式相比有缺陷的概念，除了通过视觉或触觉或感官之一之外，我们不会想到。（Phdn.75a）这段话表明知觉是认识形式的必要条件。为了揭示柏拉图的知觉观，我在早期的苏格拉底对话中追溯了亚里士多德认为苏格拉底的例证法（paradeigma）和归纳推理法（epaktikoi logoi）。在这些对话中，柏拉图通常让苏格拉底从日常经验和共同观点出发，对伦理学术语进行明确的定义。在这个过程中，柏拉图似乎遇到了一个关于调查的难题，即“为了获得一个普遍的，我们必须收集相同的例子 ...更多信息 但是，为了收集同类的例子，我们必须已经获得了普遍的想法。为了解决这个难题，柏拉图在《中世纪对话录》中引入了回忆（anamnesis）理论。我建议的解释是，《美诺》中一个奴隶男孩的著名的回忆实验旨在表明关于“2”概念的理解的经验发展，辩证法的基本原理（dialektike）在实验过程中得到了揭示。这与弗莱维特的解释不同，弗莱维特认为实验是为了显示与生俱来的独立于感觉经验的逻辑推理能力。我在《斐多篇》和《理想国》中重建了辩证法的程序，明确了意见、经验和知觉的作用。特别是在感知的瞬间，是对物体的一些一般特征的把握。这是辩证法把握形式的出发点（本原），尽管它可能是模糊的。知觉的这一功能在后来的对话录《泰阿泰德篇》中得到了研究。亚里士多德的“次概念”是柏拉图对知识与知觉关系的思考之旅的遗产。少