"Public Spirit" of Banks and Normative Analysis of Banking Behavior

银行的“公益精神”与银行行为的规范分析

• 批准号: 07630086
• 负责人: TAKIGAWA Yoshio
• 金额: $ 1.09万
• 依托单位: KOBE UNIVERSITY
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 1995
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 1995 至 1996
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-07630086/
• 关键词: Banking Business; Public Spirit; Normative Analysis; Game Theory; Postal Saving Banks; バブル; 銀行; 官営の郵便貯金; 郵便貯金の民営化; 社会的厚生; 複占モデル; 預貯金市場; 公共性; 投機; 情報の非対称性; 規範的分析

1. Banking Business and "Public Spirit" of Banks2. The Economic Function of Banking Business(1) Raison d'etre of Banks(2) Special Characteristics of Banks3. Normative Analysis of Banking Business(1) Industrial Policy of Banking Business(2) Normative Analysis of Banking Business4. Private Finance and Public Finance : A Game Theoretical AnalysisWe construct a duopoly model of commercial bank and Postal Saving Banks and study static and dynamic games between them. This paper consists of ;I IntroductionII Static and dynamic Cournot games between private financial intermediariesIII Static and dynamic Cournot games between private financial intermediaries and public financial intermediariesIV Monopoly behavior of public financial intermediaries and private financial intermediariesV Static and dynamic Bertrand games between private financial intermediariesVI Dynamic Bertrand games between private financial intermediaries and public financial intermediaries where the financial product is indifferentVII Static and dynamic Bertrand games between private financial intermediaries where the financial product is differentiatedVIII Static and dynamic Bertrand games between private financial intermediaries and public financial intermediaries where the financial product is differentiatedIX Conclusions

1.银行业务与银行的“公共精神”银行业务的经济功能(1)银行的存在理由(2)银行的特点3.银行业务规范分析(1)银行业务产业政策(2)银行业务规范分析4.民间金融与公共金融：博弈论分析构建了商业银行和邮政储蓄银行的双头垄断模型，研究了商业银行和邮政储蓄银行之间的静态和动态博弈。本文包括：I引言II私人金融中介与公共金融中介之间的静态和动态古诺博弈IV公共金融中介和私人金融中介的垄断行为V私人金融中介之间的静态和动态Bertrand博弈VI在金融产品不同的情况下私人金融中介和公共金融中介之间的动态Bertrand博弈7私人金融中介之间的静态和动态Bertrand博弈

项目成果

瀧川好夫: "投機の本質:ゲーム理論的アプローチ(予定)" 国民経済雑誌(神戸大学). 第173巻第5号. (1996)

泷川吉夫：“投机的本质：博弈论方法（计划）”《国民经济杂志》（神户大学）第 173 卷，第 5 期（1996 年）。

Yoshio Takigawa: ""A Game Theoretical Analysis of a duopoly model of commercial bank and Postal Saving Banks"" Annual Report of the Faculty of Economics of Kobe University. 43. 27-70 (1997)

泷川义雄：《商业银行与邮政储蓄银行双头垄断模型的博弈论分析》神户大学经济学院年报。

Yoshio Takigawa: ""A Game Theoretical Analysis on Speculative Bubble"" Kokumin-Keizaizasshi. Vol.173, No.5. 31-43 (1996)

Yoshio Takikawa：““投机泡沫的博弈论分析””Kokumin-Keizasshi。

Yoshio Takigawa: "Modern Monetary Economics : Money, Credit and Banking" Keiso-Publishing Company. (Forthcoming). (1997)

泷川吉夫：《现代货币经济学：货币、信贷和银行》Keiso 出版公司。

滝川好夫: "「銀行預金と郵便貯金の複占モデルについてのゲーム理論的分析-郵便貯金のraison d'etre-」" 『神戸大学経済学研究年報』. 43. 27-70 (1997)

Yoshio Takikawa：“银行存款和邮政储蓄双头垄断模型的博弈论分析 - 邮政储蓄的存在理由”神户大学经济研究年度报告 43. 27-70 (1997)。