权益分类	功能权益	普通用户	{{item.name}}会员
{{category.name}}	{{benefitItem.name}}

Naturalizing the mind in terms of teleological functionalism

根据目的论功能主义使心灵自然化

基本信息

批准号：
08610007
负责人：
NOBUHARA Yukihiro
金额：
$ 1.09万
依托单位：
The University of Tokyo
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
1996
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
1996 至 1997
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

The purpose of this project is to naturalize our minds in terms of telelogical functionalism, which views a mind as a device of enabling us to adapt to the environment. In particular, I tried to solve the problems which occurs from naturalizing intentionality and consciousness. The results are the follwing.1. Proposituinal attitudes such as beliefs and desires have syntactical structure and are governed by logical inference while brain states lack syntactical structure and are governed by dynamical pattern transformation as connectionists suggest. So it follows that propositional attitudes are not realized individually by some brain state, at most being realized wholly by the total of brain states. But conscious propositional attitudes are realized individually by some utterance or neural activation pattern in motor cortex.2. Ratinality is constitutive of propositional attitudes. It is not nomological since it is not condifiable as a set of principles. So it follows that the telelogical functions of propositional attitudes are not nomological. This shows that the primary reason of an action is not its cause. It leads to the refutation of the causal theory of action. Nonetheless the telelogical functions are realisable by some mechnisms of connections type so that they are not unnaturalizable functions.3. Sensory qualities or so-called qualia of conscious mental states are arguable not their intrinsic properties but comprise their intentional contents. So it is necessary to reinterprete an experience of pain, for example, as intentional and the property of having a pain as objective. This reintepretation is not impossible.

这个项目的目的是从远程逻辑功能主义的角度来自然化我们的思想，它将思想视为使我们能够适应环境的一种装置。特别是，我试图解决自然化意向性和意识所产生的问题。研究结果如下：1.信念和欲望等命题态度具有句法结构，并受逻辑推理的支配，而大脑状态缺乏句法结构，并受联结主义者建议的动态模式转换的支配。由此可见，命题态度不是由某个大脑状态单独实现的，最多是由大脑状态的总和实现的。而有意识的命题态度则是通过个体的言语表达或运动皮层的神经激活模式来实现的.合理性是命题态度的组成部分。它不是法则的，因为它不能作为一套原则加以制约。因此，命题态度的远程逻辑功能不是法则性的。这表明，一个行动的主要原因不是它的原因。它导致了对行动因果理论的反驳。然而，远程逻辑功能是可实现的一些mechanisms的连接类型，使他们不是unnaturalizable功能。3.意识心理状态的感觉品质或所谓的感受质不是它们的内在属性，而是包括它们的意向内容。因此，有必要将痛苦的体验重新定义为意向性的，并将具有痛苦的属性重新定义为客观的。这种重新解释并非不可能。