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Examinations of Naturalistic Approach to Human Cognitive Activities

人类认知活动的自然主义方法检验

基本信息

批准号：
10610011
负责人：
TANJI Nobunaru
金额：
$ 1.66万
依托单位：
Tokyo Metropolitan University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
1998
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
1998 至 2000
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

Certain puzzling elements can be detected in recent attempts to give a thoroughly naturalistic explanation of the human cognitive activities. First, such prima facie unnaturalistic notions as meaning, proposition and "unverifiable" causal relations between mind and cirsumstances are often appealed to in semantic explanations of intentional attitudes. Secondly, genuine modal notions (logical or mathematical necessity and possibility) are usually introduced into nominalistic reconstructions of the mathematical theories either as surrogate for abstract entities or, at least, as indispensable primitive logical properties. We find it necessary to inquire whether these notions are capable of re-analysis so as to be acceptable according to the basic principles of naturalism. TANJI points out that what narturalism tells us is that our naive faith in uniquely specifiable "genuine" belief-contents is inherently inconsistent amtd untenable. NOMOTO seeks to reforge the notion of Frege's sense by way of developing a global semantic analysis of belief ascriptions. SHINOHARA suggests that we reexamine the problem of self-knowledge front the standpoint of naturalism. ISHIKAWA concentrates on the Kant's analysis of the notion of possibility and warns against naive modal realism. KANZAKI attempts to elucidate what consequences naturalism will have in relation to moral philosophy, in particular, to moral realism. OKAMOTO seeks to explain the possibility of our mathematical knowlegde by scrutinizing the way we invent and construct the (informal and formalized ) languages of mathematics.

在最近对人类认知活动进行彻底的自然主义解释的尝试中，可以发现某些令人困惑的因素。首先，意向性态度的语义学解释常常诉诸于诸如意义、命题和心灵与情境之间“无法证实的”因果关系等表面上的非自然主义概念。其次，真正的模态概念（逻辑或数学的必然性和可能性）通常被引入数学理论的唯名论重建中，或者作为抽象实体的替代物，或者至少作为不可缺少的原始逻辑属性。我们发现有必要探究这些概念是否能够重新分析，以便根据自然主义的基本原则被接受。谭治指出叙事主义告诉我们的是，我们对唯一可具体化的“真实”信仰内容的天真信仰本质上是不一致和站不住脚的。野本试图通过对信念归属进行全面的语义分析来重新塑造弗雷格的意义概念。筱原建议我们从自然主义的立场重新审视自我认识问题。石川关注康德对可能性概念的分析，并对朴素的模态实在论提出了警告。神崎试图阐明自然主义将对道德哲学，特别是道德实在论产生什么样的后果。冈本试图通过仔细研究我们发明和构建数学语言（非正式和正式）的方式来解释我们数学知识的可能性。