Research on economic theory of anti-trust law

在两年的研究中，我们取得了以下成果：(1)基于信息和激励的方法，分析了一般监管制度的最优设计。特别地，发现了层级管制比直接管制更有效的条件。(2)在重复竞争博弈下，考虑了卡特尔威慑的执行策略。从反垄断法的角度对招投标规则进行了评估。研究表明，在可能存在合谋的情况下，参与者的研究价格低于竞争性市场的情况。(4)对寡头垄断市场中横向兼并的福利进行了分析。研究表明，在存在负协同效应的情况下，非效率企业获得了增加社会福利的收益。(5)将排他性交易的效率问题分析为合作投资中的阻碍问题。结果表明，当进入者具有市场支配力且不可能进行重新谈判时，预期损害规则比违约性损害规则能够诱导更有效的交易。(6)从福利分析的角度考察了搭售的违法性。研究表明，在一个市场中具有市场支配力的企业往往会对另一个市场，特别是垂直市场产生影响，从而增加社会福利。

Performances obtained in our two-year research were as follows.(1)An optimal design of general regulatory system was analysed on the basis of information and incentive approach. In particular, the condition under where a hierachical regulation was more efficient than a direct regulation was found.(2)An enforcement policy of cartel deterrence was considered under a repeated competition game. The structure of penalty policy and monitoring policy was explicitly showned.(3)Public bidding rules was evaluated form the point of view of anti-trust law. Researvation prices of the participants was showned to become lower than in the case of competitive market in the case that collusion was possible.(4)An welfare analysis of horizontal merger in an oligopolistic market was done. An acquisitonagainst inefficient firm was showned to increase the social welfare when negative synergy effect of merger existed.(5)The efficiency problem of exclusive dealings was analysed as a hold-up problem in cooperative investment. As result, expected damage rule was showned to induce more efficient transaction than liquidated damage rule when entrants had market power and the renegotitiation was impossible.(6)Illegality of tying in sale was examined from the point of view of welfare analysis. A firm with a market power in a market was showned to have a trend to make an influence on another market, in particular , a vertical market and increase the social welfare.