Comparative Analysis of Political Governance Structures

在本研究中，我们将政治治理结构建模为政治参与者之间的博弈，对结构进行了比较分析，并考察了不同政治阶段的经济效率问题。细梭的“区域整合与分离与寻租”一文显示了政治家的寻租行为对两个区域的有效整合带来了多大的偏见。细尾在《政治家与官僚的政治治理结构比较分析》中发现，当政治家能够决定权力分配时，他们会将社会过剩的权力分配给自己，而占主导地位的官僚体制对政治家的权力委托是其他体制中最小的。金崎在《地方政府整合中的选举与特殊利益集团》一文中论述了特殊利益集团游说活动对两个地方政府整合的影响，并介绍了过度整合和不足整合的情况。在“软预算与溢出效应”一文中，我们考察了政府软预算问题和公共产品在两个地区的溢出效应。结果表明，公共产品供给过剩可能会降低软预算效应。最后在Miura的《公共物品采购的一般评价方法》中，我们对公共物品采购机制进行了比较分析，并对公共物品采购的一般评价方法进行了新的设计，在政治家和利益集团之间的权力博弈框架中寻求光学机制。

In this research we made modeling the structures of political governance as games among political players , made some comparative analysis of the structures, and examined the problem of economic efficiency in various kinds of political phases. Hosoe "Regional Integration and Separation with Rent Seeking" showed how much bias rent seeking activity by Politicians brings with respect to efficient integration of two regions. And in Hosoe " Comparative Analysis of Political Governance Structures between Politicians and Bureaucrats ," we found that the politicians allocate the socially excess authority to themselves when they can decide authority allocation, and the dominant bureaucrats system has the smallest delegation of the authority to politicians compared to any other system. In Kanazaki "Election and Special Interest Group in Integration of Local Government " we argued about the influences on lobbing activity by special interest groups on integration of two local governments and introduced the condition of excess integration and under integration. In Miura "Soft Budget and Spillover Effect " , we examined, about soft budget problem for government and the spillover effect of public goods on two regions. As a result, it was shown that there is a possibility that excess supply of public goods decreases the soft budget effect. Finally in Miura "General Evaluation Method of Public Bidding ", we made the comparative analysis of procurement mechanism of public goods and made a new design of a general evaluation method for public bidding and sought the optical mechanism in the framework of power game among politicians and interest groups.