Comparative Analysis of Political Governance Structures

本研究将政治治理结构建模为政治参与者之间的博弈，并对政治治理结构进行比较分析，考察不同政治阶段的经济效率问题。细江的“区域一体化与分离与寻租”表明了政治家的寻租活动对两个地区的有效一体化带来了多大的偏见。细江在《关于政治家与官僚的政治治理结构的比较分析》中发现，政治家在能够决定权力分配的情况下，会将社会上的过剩权力分配给自己，而在主导型官僚体制中，政治家的权力分配最少。金崎在《地方政府一体化中的选举与特殊利益集团》一文中，论述了特殊利益集团游说活动对两个地方政府一体化的影响，并介绍了过度一体化和欠一体化的条件。在三浦的《软预算与溢出效应》中，我们考察了政府的软预算问题和公共产品对两个地区的溢出效应。结果表明，公共产品的过度供给有可能降低软预算效应。最后，在三浦的“公共物品招标的一般评价方法“中，我们对公共物品的采购机制进行了比较分析，设计了一种新的公共物品招标的一般评价方法，并在政治家和利益集团的权力博弈框架下寻求其最优机制。

In this research we made modeling the structures of political governance as games among political players , made some comparative analysis of the structures, and examined the problem of economic efficiency in various kinds of political phases. Hosoe "Regional Integration and Separation with Rent Seeking" showed how much bias rent seeking activity by Politicians brings with respect to efficient integration of two regions. And in Hosoe " Comparative Analysis of Political Governance Structures between Politicians and Bureaucrats ," we found that the politicians allocate the socially excess authority to themselves when they can decide authority allocation, and the dominant bureaucrats system has the smallest delegation of the authority to politicians compared to any other system. In Kanazaki "Election and Special Interest Group in Integration of Local Government " we argued about the influences on lobbing activity by special interest groups on integration of two local governments and introduced the condition of excess integration and under integration. In Miura "Soft Budget and Spillover Effect " , we examined, about soft budget problem for government and the spillover effect of public goods on two regions. As a result, it was shown that there is a possibility that excess supply of public goods decreases the soft budget effect. Finally in Miura "General Evaluation Method of Public Bidding ", we made the comparative analysis of procurement mechanism of public goods and made a new design of a general evaluation method for public bidding and sought the optical mechanism in the framework of power game among politicians and interest groups.