THEORETICAL ANALYSIS ON A DYNAMIC GAME OF FISCAL RECONSTRUCTION

本文在自愿接受税收负担的框架下，通过分析各利益集团之间的无限持续时间微分博弈，研究了财政重建的动态特性。(1)通过比较财政重建的第一最优解、开环纳什均衡路径和反馈纳什均衡路径，凸显了财政重建过程中利益集团的搭便车行为。(2)我们明确地推导出了政府债务和基本支出的目标水平，以及相应解决方案下财政重建的调整速度。(3)最后，我们研究了消费税对其调整速度的影响以及各自路径的长期结果。我们还考虑了提高税收以实现财政重建的含义及其对政府规模的影响。虽然消费税带来了大量的财政收入，但单纯使用消费税并不一定能缓解财政危机，导致政府规模扩大。消费税的增加加上积极的统一转移支付，提高了消费的相对价格，而不会提高放弃政府收入方面的特权的边际成本，从而导致更早的特许权和更好的财政重建。

This paper investigates dynamic properties of fiscal reconstruction by analyzing the infinite duration differential game among various interest groups with a framework of voluntary acceptance of tax burden.(1) By comparing the first-best solution of fiscal reconstruction, the open-loop Nash equilibrium path, and the feedback Nash equilibrium path, we highlight the free riding behavior of interest groups in the process of fiscal reconstruction.(2) We derive explicitly the target levels of government debt and primary expenditures, and the adjustment speed of fiscal reconstruction under the respective solutions.(3) We finally examine the impacts of consumption taxes on their adjustment speeds as well as long-run outcomes of the respective paths. We also consider the implication of raising taxes to attain fiscal reconstruction and its effect on the size of government. Although consumption taxes bring a lot of revenues, the sole use of consumption taxes does not necessarily alleviate the fiscal crisis, resulting in enlarging the size of government. An increase in consumption taxes combined with positive uniform transfers raises the relative price of consumption in terms of privileges without raising the marginal cost of giving up privileges in terms of government revenue, inducing earlier concession and better fiscal reconstruction.