THEORETICAL ANALYSIS ON A DYNAMIC GAME OF FISCAL RECONSTRUCTION

财政重建动态博弈的理论分析

• 批准号: 10630084
• 负责人: ITAYA Jun-ichi
• 金额: $ 1.34万
• 依托单位: HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 1998
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 1998 至 2000
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-10630084/
• 关键词: FISCAL RECONSTRUCTION; DYNAMIC GAME; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; INTEREST GROUP; 公共財; フラー・ライダー; 徴分ゲーム; オープン・ループ; クローズ・ループ

This paper investigates dynamic properties of fiscal reconstruction by analyzing the infinite duration differential game among various interest groups with a framework of voluntary acceptance of tax burden.(1) By comparing the first-best solution of fiscal reconstruction, the open-loop Nash equilibrium path, and the feedback Nash equilibrium path, we highlight the free riding behavior of interest groups in the process of fiscal reconstruction.(2) We derive explicitly the target levels of government debt and primary expenditures, and the adjustment speed of fiscal reconstruction under the respective solutions.(3) We finally examine the impacts of consumption taxes on their adjustment speeds as well as long-run outcomes of the respective paths. We also consider the implication of raising taxes to attain fiscal reconstruction and its effect on the size of government. Although consumption taxes bring a lot of revenues, the sole use of consumption taxes does not necessarily alleviate the fiscal crisis, resulting in enlarging the size of government. An increase in consumption taxes combined with positive uniform transfers raises the relative price of consumption in terms of privileges without raising the marginal cost of giving up privileges in terms of government revenue, inducing earlier concession and better fiscal reconstruction.

本文在税收负担自愿接受的框架下，通过分析各利益集团之间的无期限差分博弈，考察财政重构的动态特性。(1)通过比较财政重建的最优解、开环纳什均衡路径和反馈纳什均衡路径，突出了利益集团在财政重建过程中的搭便车行为。(2)明确推导出政府债务和基本支出的目标水平，以及各自方案下财政重建的调整速度。(3)最后考察了消费税对两者调整速度的影响以及各自路径的长期结果。我们还考虑了提高税收以实现财政重建的含义及其对政府规模的影响。虽然消费税带来了大量的收入，但仅仅使用消费税并不一定会缓解财政危机，从而导致政府规模的扩大。增加消费税与积极的统一转移相结合，提高了特权方面的消费相对价格，而不会提高放弃特权方面的政府收入的边际成本，从而诱导更早的让步和更好的财政重建。

项目成果

IHORI,T AND ITAYA,JUN-ICHI: "A DYNAMIC MODEL OF FISCAL RECONSTRUCTION"JOURNAL, VOLUME-NUMBER, PAGES CONCERNED, YEAR EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. VOL 17, NO.4. (2001)

IHORI,T 和 Itaya,Jun-ichi：“财政重建的动态模型”期刊，卷数，相关页数，欧洲政治经济学杂志。

Ihori, T, and Itaya, J.: "A Dynamic Model of Fiscal Reconstruction"European Journal of Political Economy. 17巻4号. (2001)

Ihori, T 和 Itaya, J.：“财政重建的动态模型”《欧洲政治经济学杂志》，第 17 卷，第 4 期（2001 年）。

Ihori,T,and Itaya,J.: "A Dynamic Model of Fiscal Reconstruction"European Journal of Political Economy. 17巻4号. (2001)

Ihori, T 和 Itaya, J.：“财政重建的动态模型”《欧洲政治经济学杂志》，第 17 卷，第 4 期（2001 年）。

板谷淳一, 井堀利宏: "『財政再建の理論的分析』" フィナンシャル・レビュー. 第47号. 1-31 (1998)

Junichi Itaya，Toshihiro Ibori：“财政重组的理论分析”《金融评论》第 47 期。1-31 (1998)。