Studies on the Philosophical Backgrounds of Third-Generation Corruptive Sciences

1.生态心理学（J. J.吉布森）和实施理论（F. J.瓦雷拉和其他人）都需要一个新的本体论和一个新的认识论：本体论避免二分法现实主义/唯心主义，认识论避免二分法客观主义/主观主义。在这方面，这两种理论与M.梅洛-庞蒂。2.因此，遵循梅洛-庞蒂的思想，可以为第三代认知科学（生态心理学和生成论是第三代认知科学的两大贡献）提供良好的哲学基础。另一方面，我们可以根据认知科学的最新研究，重新估计梅洛-庞蒂哲学的范围。例如，我们可以把吉布森和梅洛-庞蒂的本体论称为“处置的现实主义”（KONO）。认知不是由大脑完成的，而是由脑-体-环境系统完成的。即使从联结主义的观点来看，如果我们承认这一点，我们也可以反驳心灵同一论。吉布森和瓦雷拉的反表征主义与联结主义是相容的，如果我们把后者放在脑-体-环境系统（NOGAWA）的语境中去考察的话。认知语义学（G. Lakoff，M.约翰逊等人）未能承认语言意义建构的主体间性。基于发展心理学的最新研究，特别是对“心理理论”的研究，这一缺陷可以被消除（中村）。我们可以通过重新解释关联理论（D。Sperber和D.威尔逊）作为一个肉理论的心灵。

1. Bcological Psychology (J.J. Gibson) and Enaction Theory (F.J. Varela and others) both require a new ontology and a new epistemology: the ontology that avoids the dichotomy Realism/Idealism, the epistemology that avoids the dichotomy Objectivism/Subjectivism. In the respect, these two theories coincide with the philosophy of M. Merleau-Ponty.2. Therefore, we can provide a good philosophical basis to Third-Generation Cognitive Sciences (of which Ecological Psychology and Enaction Theory are two major contributions) by following Merleau-Ponty. On the other hand, we can re-estimate the scope of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy in the light of recent studies in cognitive sciences. For example, we may construe Gibson's and Merleau-Ponty's ontology as "Realism of disposition" (KONO).3. Cognition is not performed by a brain, but by brain-body-environment system. Even form a connectionist point of view, we can refute the Identity Theory of Mind, if we admit this (NOBUHARA). Anti-representationalism, purported by both Gibson and Varela, could be compatible with connectionism, if we construe the latter in the context of brain-body-environment system (NOGAWA).4. Cognitive Semantics (G. Lakoff, M. Johnson, and others) have failed to acknowledge the intersubjectivity of linguistic meaning construction. On the basis of the recent researches in Developmental Psychology, especially studies on "theory of mind", this deficiency can be removed (NAKAMURA). And we may reconceptualize communication from the perspective of "behavior", not that of "representation", by reinterpreting Relevance Theory (D. Sperber and D. Wilson) as a meat-theory of mind.