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Game theoretic Analysis for Cost Allocation of Cooperative Projects of Local Governments

地方政府合作项目成本分配的博弈分析

基本信息

批准号：
12630014
负责人：
OHIRA Sumihiko
金额：
$ 1.6万
依托单位：
University of Shizuoka
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2000
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2000 至 2001
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-12630014/
关键词：
core index core index formula Cost allocation problem with benefits total coalition value of sub games method cooperative game externality the maximum core indexes of sub games method optimal coalition structure 協力ゲーム理論提携値総和最大法

项目摘要

1) A core index of cooperative games that is defined as minimum of maximal excess of coalitions on condition that sum of payoffs of all players is equal to worth of grand coalition is proposed. A core index which evaluates cooperative games by a real number from excesses of coalitions perspective is useful not only for deciding optimal coalitions structure but also for analyzing market games.2) We analyze cooperative projects of local governments by cooperative game theory. Cooperative game theory has been applied to cost allocation problems in which costs are given for all coalitions. We propose anew formulation in which not only costs but also benefits are given for all coalitions. We show the procedure for deriving a coalition game from a cost allocation problem where benefit exists. Furthermore a concept of optimal coalition structure is introduced and discussed in this model. This new formulation is extended to the case in which externality is allowed.3) Concept of an optimal coalition structure in a game, which plays an important role when applying a cooperative game to a cost allocation problem is introduced. Two methods of determining an optimal coalition structure in a game are proposed. One method is to maximize the sum of total coalition value of sub games; another is to minimize the maximum core indexes of sub games. Properties of both methods are examined. These two methods are applied to the game introduced by a cost allocation problem of local governments which construct jointly water supply facilities.

1)提出了一个合作对策的核心指标，该指标定义为在所有参与者的收益之和等于大联盟价值的条件下联盟的最大剩余的最小值。从联盟过度角度对合作博弈进行实数评价的核心指标，不仅有助于确定最优的联盟结构，而且有助于分析市场博弈。2)运用合作博弈论对地方政府的合作项目进行分析。合作博弈论已被应用于成本分配问题，其中所有联盟的成本都是已知的。我们提出了一种新的提法，其中不仅给出了所有联盟的成本，而且还给出了收益。我们展示了从存在利益的成本分配问题中推导出联盟博弈的过程。在该模型中，引入了最优联盟结构的概念，并对其进行了讨论。3)引入了博弈中最优联盟结构的概念，它在合作博弈应用于成本分配问题时起着重要作用。提出了两种确定博弈中最优联盟结构的方法。一种方法是最大化各子博弈的联盟总价值之和，另一种是最小化各子博弈的最大核心指标。研究了这两种方法的性能。将这两种方法应用于地方政府共同建设供水设施的成本分摊问题的博弈中。