A Study on Optimal Trade and Environmental Policies in The International Oligopoly with Overseas Production and Pollution

海外生产与污染的国际寡头垄断下的最优贸易与环境政策研究

• 批准号: 13630076
• 负责人: ISHII Yasunori
• 金额: $ 0.64万
• 依托单位: Waseda University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2001
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2001 至 2002
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-13630076/
• 关键词: An internationally duopolistic market; Optimal environmental pollution taxes; Overseas production with environmental pollution; Multinational firms; Global environmental pollution; 多国籍企業; グローバルな環境汚染; 環境汚染の国際間スピルオーバー; 戦略的環境税; 最適環境税水準; 国際寡占; 環境汚染

Establishing a simple model of a international oligopoly where two big firms produce goods as well as pollution in the home and foreign courtiers, this study has examined the optimal environmental pollution taxes adopted by the home government. The main results are summarized as followings:1. Even if the foreign government would not adopt any environmental taxes, the home government can vary pollution emission in the world through changing only its own environmental pollution taxes.2. The optimal environmental pollution taxes imposed by the home government are not always positive, depending on market demand functions, cost functions, environmental damage functions, spill-over coefficients of environmental pollution and so on. Therefore, it is not appropriate, from a standpoint of optimal resource allocation, that the home government always sets its environmental pollution taxes positive.3. When the foreign government is too indifferent to environmental pollution, a rise of the environmental pollution tax in the home country has a possibility to generate a pollution export from the home country to the foreign country as well as to increase total pollution emission in the world.4. Since the environmental pollution taxes imposed by the home government have the great effects on the economic welfare of the foreign country which might be negative, the home government should consider such the effects when it adopts the environmental pollution taxes.5. A fiscal expense in which the home government adopts the environmental pollution taxes that maximizes the joint economic welfare of the home and foreign countries seems to be almost the same as a fiscal expense in which the home government adopts the environmental pollution taxes that maximizes merely the economic welfare of the home country. Hence, there exists a big feasibility that the home government adopts the former environmental pollution taxes.

这项研究建立了一个简单的国际寡头垄断模型，其中两家大公司在国内外生产商品和污染，研究了国内政府采用的最优环境污染税。主要结果如下：1.即使外国政府不征收任何环境税，本国政府也可以通过只改变本国的环境污染税来改变世界上的污染排放。由于市场需求函数、成本函数、环境损害函数、环境污染溢出系数等因素的影响，我国政府征收的最优环境污染税并不总是积极的。因此，从资源优化配置的角度来看，本国政府总是将其环境污染税设定为正数是不合适的。当外国政府对环境污染漠不关心时，母国环境污染税的提高有可能产生母国向外国的污染出口，并增加全球污染排放总量。由于母国政府征收的环境污染税对外国的经济福利有很大的影响，可能是负面的，因此母国政府在征收环境污染税时应该考虑这种影响。本国政府征收环境污染税以最大化本国和外国的共同经济福利的财政支出似乎与本国政府采用仅最大化本国经济福利的环境污染税的财政支出几乎相同。因此，地方政府征收原环境污染税具有很大的可行性。