Analysis of Intellectual Property Law System focusing on the Function of Market and Law-A Pragmatic Exercise in Law and Economics-

本研究首先考察了知识产权法和经济学的各种理论框架。特别是，研究评估了知识产权的前景理论，该理论主张在知识创造的中间成果进入市场之前就授予权利，以防止事后寻租。研究发现，这种理解只强调知识产权与市场关系的单一方面，而忽视了对知识创造早期阶段的保护会激发事前寻租（即专利竞赛）的观察。此外，研究发现，只要专有权本身会产生成本，知识产权法就应该以更针对行业的方式进行量身定制和制定，当上述一般性研究成果应用于具体实践时，特别提出以下观察：关于员工发明，当我们考虑日本专利法第35条的立法意图时，薪酬应适当鼓励雇主和雇员的发明活动。在这种情况下，考虑到财富效应，如果绝对数额过大，则可减少作为福利份额给予雇员的补偿。这将激励那些在同一组织内为发明活动做出贡献的人，而不是发明者。研究表明，即使雇员的利益份额减少，由于财富效应允许对雇员发明者给予相同程度的激励，否则将归属于雇员发明者的份额可能仍然属于雇主，因此利益可以通过就业合同由市场进一步分配。

The research examined first various theoretical frameworks of intellectual property law and economics. Especially, the research assessed the prospect theory of intellectual property which argues in favor of granting rights covering intermediate results of intellectual creation even before they reach the market, so as to prevent rent seeking, ex post. The research finds that this understanding emphases only single aspect of the relationship between intellectual property and the market, and downplays the observation that the protection at the early stage of intellectual creation would motivate rent seeking ex ante (i.e.race to patent). In addition, the research found that as long as the exclusive right itself creates costs, intellectual property law should be tailored and developed in a more industry specific manner.When the above general research findings are applied to specific practices, especially the following observation is made ;Concerning employee inventions, when we consider the legislative intent of the section 35 of the Japanese patent act, the remuneration should provide a proper incentive to inventive activities of both employers and employees. In this context, taking wealth effect into account, the compensation to the employee as a share of benefit may be reduced, in case where the absolute amount becomes too large. This would provide incentives to those who contribute to the inventive activities within the same organization, other than the inventor. The research suggested that even when the share of benefit for the employee is reduced, as the wealth effect allows the same level of incentives to the employee inventor, the share which would otherwise be attributed to the employee inventor may remain with the employer so that the benefit may be further distributed by the market via employment contract.