ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON THE JAPANESE CARE SERVICE MARKET WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION

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Our research has two major purposes. One is to investigate whether providers produce high or low quality service in the Japanese care service market. Though the Japanese Care Insurance has a kind of quasi-market, providers are subject to a fixed price system and consumers are faced with imperfect information about suppliers. Under these market conditions, we find that providers can put high quality on their service by adapting higher fixed price for service, by regulating quality norm, or by educating consumers. We also confirm these results by economic experiments.Another is to explore adequate manners how to diffuse information concerning quality of service a provider produces. The Japanese government has made a freedom of information act about care service provider since 2006. But the act does not give any evaluation for quality of care service each provider produces. We introduce examples of the third party assessment, in Fukuoka city and Kitakyushu city. We have studied an original evaluation system that is based on Consumer Satisfaction Analysis. We have not completed the new system yet.