ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON THE JAPANESE CARE SERVICE MARKET WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION

我们的研究有两个主要目的。一是调查日本护理服务市场的提供者提供的服务质量是高还是低。日本的医疗保险虽然是一种准市场，但提供者受制于固定价格制度，消费者对提供者的信息不完全。在这些市场条件下，我们发现供应商可以通过调整更高的服务固定价格、规范质量规范或教育消费者来提高服务质量。我们还通过经济实验证实了这些结果。另一个是探索适当的方式如何传播有关提供者提供的服务质量的信息。日本政府从2006年开始制定了有关护理服务提供者的信息自由法。但是，该法案没有对每个提供者提供的护理服务质量进行任何评估。我们在福冈市和北九州市介绍了第三方评估的例子。我们研究了一个基于消费者满意度分析的原创评价体系。我们还没有完成新系统。

Our research has two major purposes. One is to investigate whether providers produce high or low quality service in the Japanese care service market. Though the Japanese Care Insurance has a kind of quasi-market, providers are subject to a fixed price system and consumers are faced with imperfect information about suppliers. Under these market conditions, we find that providers can put high quality on their service by adapting higher fixed price for service, by regulating quality norm, or by educating consumers. We also confirm these results by economic experiments.Another is to explore adequate manners how to diffuse information concerning quality of service a provider produces. The Japanese government has made a freedom of information act about care service provider since 2006. But the act does not give any evaluation for quality of care service each provider produces. We introduce examples of the third party assessment, in Fukuoka city and Kitakyushu city. We have studied an original evaluation system that is based on Consumer Satisfaction Analysis. We have not completed the new system yet.