Analysis on the roles of norms in repeated games and institutional design to deter collusion

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Two articles joint with In-Koo Cho have been published in international journals. One of them, entitled "Learning aspiration in repeated games" published in the Journal of Economic Theory, studies repeated games played by the players who behave according to satisficing theory, as opposed to optimizing theory. It shows that cooperation emerges as a unique outcome instead of the folk theorem.Another article joint with Yamamori, Kato, and Kawagoe has been accepted for publication in Experimental Economics. We conducted the experiment of dictator games and studied the effects of payoff-irrelevent voice on the share. The past studies claim that voice does not matter even if we assume other-regarding preferences. However, if we reproduce a situation with voice, voice matters in a positive way in the sense that it increases the share of the recipients.