Analysis on the roles of norms in repeated games and institutional design to deter collusion

规范在重复博弈中的作用分析及遏制串通的制度设计

• 批准号: 17330040
• 负责人: MATSUI Akihiko
• 金额: $ 8.92万
• 依托单位: The University of Tokyo
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
• 财政年份: 2005
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2005 至 2007
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-17330040/
• 关键词: long term relationship; norms; voice; experimental economics; repeated games; dictator games; 独占禁止法; 2×2同時手番ゲーム; 満足化原理; サーチ; 協力; 寡占市場; 経済学実験; 談合

Two articles joint with In-Koo Cho have been published in international journals. One of them, entitled "Learning aspiration in repeated games" published in the Journal of Economic Theory, studies repeated games played by the players who behave according to satisficing theory, as opposed to optimizing theory. It shows that cooperation emerges as a unique outcome instead of the folk theorem.Another article joint with Yamamori, Kato, and Kawagoe has been accepted for publication in Experimental Economics. We conducted the experiment of dictator games and studied the effects of payoff-irrelevent voice on the share. The past studies claim that voice does not matter even if we assume other-regarding preferences. However, if we reproduce a situation with voice, voice matters in a positive way in the sense that it increases the share of the recipients.

与In-Koo Cho合作的两篇文章已在国际期刊上发表。其中一篇题为《在重复博弈中学习渴望》（Learning aspiration in repeated games）的文章发表在《经济理论杂志》（Journal of Economic Theory）上，研究了根据满足理论而不是优化理论行事的参与者所进行的重复博弈。与山森、加藤、川越合著的另一篇文章已被《实验经济学》接受发表。我们进行了独裁者博弈的实验，研究了支付无关的声音对份额的影响。过去的研究声称，即使我们假设了关于他人的偏好，声音也不重要。然而，如果我们用声音重现一种情况，声音就会以一种积极的方式发挥作用，因为它增加了接受者的份额。

项目成果

When You Ask Zeus a Favor : The Third Party's Voice in a Dictator Game

当你向宙斯求助时：独裁者游戏中第三方的声音

• 期刊: Japanese Economic Review (掲載決定)
• 作者: In-Koo Cho;Akihiko Matsui;黒柳米司(編);Akihiko Matsui;Akihiko Matsui;Akihiko Matsui;Tetsuo Yamamori(共著)
• 通讯作者: Tetsuo Yamamori(共著)

A Theory of Money and Marketplaces

货币与市场理论

• 发表时间: 2005
• 期刊: International Economic Review 46
• 作者: Akihiko Matsui;Daisuke Oyama;Sato;Yoshino;Yamada;Yamada;黒柳 米司;Akihiko Matsui
• 通讯作者: Akihiko Matsui

Learning aspiration in repeated games

• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.12.001
• 发表时间: 2005-10-01
• 期刊: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• 影响因子: 1.6
• 作者: Cho, IK;Matsui, A
• 通讯作者: Matsui, A

Comments on 'Money is Privacy' by Charles Kahn, James McAndrews, and William Roberds : Monetary Theory and Game Theory

查尔斯·卡恩、詹姆斯·麦克安德鲁斯和威廉·罗伯兹对《金钱就是隐私》的评论：货币理论和博弈论

• 发表时间: 2005
• 期刊: International Economic Review vol.46
• 作者: Akihiko Matsui;Takashi Shimizu;吉野 文雄;Akihiko Matsui
• 通讯作者: Akihiko Matsui

Rationalizable Foresight Dynamics

合理化的预见动力

• 发表时间: 2006
• 期刊: Games and Economic Behavior 56
• 作者: Tetsuo Yamamori;Kazuhiko Kato;Toshiji Kawagoe;Akihiko Matsui;Akihiko Matsui
• 通讯作者: Akihiko Matsui