Performance of mechanisms for providing public goods and learning of equilibrium strategies : A theoretical and experimental study.

本文采用实验经济学的方法，考察了枢纽机制的表现和通过格罗夫斯-莱德机制实现纳什均衡的可能性。下面提到的两点可以从这个研究结果中体现出来。(1)在严格凹形评价函数下，用于公共产品提供规模连续变化问题的关键机制可以产生收益结构，除了讲真话作为优势策略之外没有最佳对策，因此在优势策略学习的自适应过程中，它的表现最好。2)在Groves-Ledyard机制中，惩罚参数γ大于纳什行为下收敛条件的最小值，而个体行为策略在低γ小于高γ条件下能够收敛到纳什均衡，满足超模态。

In this research, we investigated the performance of Pivotal mechanisms and attainability of Nash equilibrium through Groves-Ledyard mechanism by the experimental economics method. Two points to mention in the following can be shown as this research result. 1) Pivotal mechanism, which is applied to problem of providing size of public products changing continuously under the strictly concave evaluation function can generate the payoff structure, has no best response other than truth-telling as dominant strategy, therefore it achieves the best performance under adaptive processes for learning dominant strategy. 2) In the Groves-Ledyard mechanism, punishment parameter γ is required value over the minimum value of convergence condition under Nash behavior, however individual behavior strategies can converge to Nash equilibrium under low γ less than high γ which is able to satisfy supermodurality.