Performance of mechanisms for providing public goods and learning of equilibrium strategies : A theoretical and experimental study.

本研究以实验经济学的方法，探讨透过Groves-Ledyard机制的绩效与纳什均衡的可达性。以下两点可以作为本研究的成果。1)该机制适用于公共产品供给规模不断变化的问题，在严格凹的评价函数下能够产生支付结构，没有最佳反应，只有如实告知作为主导策略，因此在学习主导策略的自适应过程下取得最佳绩效。2)在Groves-Ledyard机制中，惩罚参数γ是Nash行为下收敛条件最小值以上的必要值，而个体行为策略在低γ小于高γ的情况下能够收敛到Nash均衡，从而满足超模态性。

In this research, we investigated the performance of Pivotal mechanisms and attainability of Nash equilibrium through Groves-Ledyard mechanism by the experimental economics method. Two points to mention in the following can be shown as this research result. 1) Pivotal mechanism, which is applied to problem of providing size of public products changing continuously under the strictly concave evaluation function can generate the payoff structure, has no best response other than truth-telling as dominant strategy, therefore it achieves the best performance under adaptive processes for learning dominant strategy. 2) In the Groves-Ledyard mechanism, punishment parameter γ is required value over the minimum value of convergence condition under Nash behavior, however individual behavior strategies can converge to Nash equilibrium under low γ less than high γ which is able to satisfy supermodurality.