The Theoretical and Experimental Study on Strategy Behavior under Mechanism for Public Decision-Making

在本研究中，我们通过分析被试在不同机制下选择的策略，研究了枢纽机制和最大限度机制在诱导讲真话方面的表现。在实验室进行决策实验，限制受试者和策略的数量：2名受试者使用3、5、8和13个策略。在实验中，每个受试者的搭档是一台计算机，它在每一轮中随机选择一种策略。该实验方法可以有效地降低被试侧策略选择的随机性。通过对实验数据集的聚类分析和自组织图（SOM）分析，我们发现，在期望被试一致选择诚实策略的情况下，相当一部分被试在选择策略时出现了一些异常行为：在枢纽机制下，被试倾向于选择忽略克拉克税的策略，在Maxmin机制下，被试选择通过计算期望效用获得最大利润的策略。在枢纽机制下，通过调整实验环境或决策环境，诚实策略的选择可能会增加。然而，在Maxmin机制下，由于利润结构中不存在优势策略，很难提高被试诱导讲真话行为的绩效。

In this research, we studied performance of Pivotal and Maxmin mechanisms in inducing truth-telling, by analyzing strategies chosen by subjects under each mechanism. Laboratory experiments on decision-making were conducted with limiting the numbers of subjects and strategies : 2 subjects with 3, 5, 8 and 13 strategies. In the experiments, the partner of each subject was a computer which chose a strategy randomly in each round. This experimental method was effective in reducing randomness in strategy-choosing by the side of subject.By applying experimental data sets to cluster analysis and self-organizing maps (SOM), we found that quite a few subjects adopt some anomalous behavior in choosing strategies where subjects are expected to choose unanimously the truth-telling strategy: a subject dominantly chooses a strategy ignoring Clarke tax under the Pivotal mechanism, and a subject chooses a strategy deriving max profit by calculating the expected utility under the Maxmin mechanism.Under the Pivotal mechanism choosing truth-telling strategies may increase by adjusting experimental or decision-making environment. However, it is difficult to improve the performance of subjects in inducing truth-telling behavior under the Maxmin mechanism, because there is no dominant strategy in profit structure in the Maxmin mechanism.