On the Possibility of Monetary Policy Rules during the Withdrawal Period from Deflation.

本文构建了货币当局进行二次目标函数最小化的模型，并给出了产出-通货膨胀率权衡的方差。这一理论分析的主要结果是，在公众的反应下，存在两种自由裁量均衡；一种是在更激进的自由裁量权下导致较少的通货膨胀，另一种是在较少的自由裁量权下导致更大的通货膨胀。此外，正在开发的动态仿真模型将反映这一理论结果，并期望得到参数估计。

In this research, it constructed the model where the monetary authority is conducting the minimization of quadratic objective function with the variance of output-inflation-rate trade off is formulated. The main result from this theoretical analysis is that, with the response from the public, there are two discretionary equilibriums ; one is to result in less inflationary under more aggressive discretion and another is more inflationary under less discretion. Furthermore, dynamic-simulation model, under development, will reflect this theoretical result, and resulting parameter estimates are expected.