Game Theoretic Study on Information and Leadership

利用博弈论模型，我们研究了团队成员在团队生产中采取领导行为的概率如何取决于他的信息能力，并由此形成了他对团队生产力的评估。我们研究了具有对称信息能力的团队和具有不对称信息能力的团队的序列均衡。我们发现：(1)在对称能力团队和非对称能力团队中都存在序列均衡；(2)在对称能力团队和非对称能力团队中都可能存在多个序列均衡；(3)采取领导行为的概率并不一定随着信息能力的提高而增加。

With a game theoretic model, we studied how a probability with which a member of a team takes a leadership behavior in team production differs depending on his informational ability with which he forms his assessment of team productivity. We studied the sequential equilibrium in a team with symmetric informational abilities and in a team with asymmetric informational abilities. We found that(1) there exists a sequential equilibrium both in a symmetric ability team and in an asymmetric ability team,(2) there may exist multiple sequential equilibria both in a symmetric ability team and in an asymmetric ability team, and(3) it is not necessarily the case that a probability of taking a leadership behavior is increased when his/her informational ability is improved.