Economic Analysis of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions

本研究对采购拍卖中的串通投标行为进行了一般性分析。在与操纵投标有关的不对称拍卖中，我们比较了收入和效率在一定程度上的不对称性。使用市政公共工程数据进行的实证分析首先分析了市政府官员参与操纵投标的情况。主要结论是，在市政府官员参与操纵投标的情况下，投标公司的积压对其中标率有正向影响。对日本公平贸易委员会建议的审查表明，卡特尔存在一定程度的繁荣。

The research has done the general analysis in bid-rigging in procurement auctions. In asymmetric auctions related to bid-rigging, we compared revenues and efficiency in terms of a degree of asymmetry. The empirical analysis usingpublic works data in a municipality was first analysis in city officials’ involvement of the bid rigging. The main conclusion is that in the city officials’ involvement of the bid rigging, backlogs of bidding firms positively influences their bid rates. The examination of Japanese Fair Trade Commission’s recommendation showed the existence of some boom of cartel.