Economic Analysis of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions

本研究对采购拍卖中的串通投标行为进行了总体分析。在与串通投标有关的不对称拍卖中，我们根据不对称程度比较了收入和效率。利用某城市公共工程数据进行实证分析，首次分析了市政官员参与串通投标的行为。主要结论是，在城市官员参与串通投标时，投标公司的积压对其投标率有积极影响。对日本公平交易委员会的建议进行的审查表明，存在一定程度的卡特尔现象。

The research has done the general analysis in bid-rigging in procurement auctions. In asymmetric auctions related to bid-rigging, we compared revenues and efficiency in terms of a degree of asymmetry. The empirical analysis usingpublic works data in a municipality was first analysis in city officials’ involvement of the bid rigging. The main conclusion is that in the city officials’ involvement of the bid rigging, backlogs of bidding firms positively influences their bid rates. The examination of Japanese Fair Trade Commission’s recommendation showed the existence of some boom of cartel.