Comprehensive Analysis of the Earnings Management in Pension Accounting

本研究以养老金会计的所有选择为研究对象，对管理者的盈余管理行为进行了全面的分析。分析结果表明，会计准则变更时负债的自由裁量权最大，是盈余管理的核心。此外，在业绩良好的公司或大型公司，可自由支配的养老金支出往往会变得很大。这与以往的先例研究所论证的预期是一致的。此外，通过琼斯模型分析其与可自由支配应计项目的关系，将其与可自由支配养老金支出的各个项目联系起来。我们或许可以通过添加养老金会计信息来提取报告的盈余管理行为。

This research focuses on all the choices about pension accounting and the earnings-management behaviour by a manager is analyzed comprehensively. The results of analysis show that the discretion in liabilities at the time of accounting-standards change is the largest and it is a core of earnings management. Moreover, in a good performance firm or a large-scale firm, discretionary pension expense tends to become large. These consistent with the anticipation about which it argues by the past precedence researches. Furthermore, as a result of analyzing relations with discretionary accrual by the Jones type model, it is connected with each item of discretionary pension expense. We may be able to extract reported-earnings management behaviour by adding pension accounting information.