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How different are Japanese and the U. S. hostile takeover laws?: A functional and public choice perspective

日本和美国的敌意收购法有何不同？：功能和公共选择的视角

基本信息

批准号：
22730072
负责人：
MATSUNAKA Manabu
金额：
$ 1.16万
依托单位：
Nagoya University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
财政年份：
2010
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2010 至 2011
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

Purposes of this research project is to analyze(1) differences between Japanese and the U. S. hostile takeover laws,(2) what makes the differences and(3) what we need to make our takeover laws better. I showed that(1) the most important difference between both laws is that while the U. S.(Delaware) clearly adopts a board-centered model, Japanese law does not clearly adopt or reject the model.(2) The difference in basic model comes from differences in rule making process concerning hostile takeover and in power and distribution of interest parties between both countries. As for Japan, although there are small possibilities of adopting laws that heavily restrict hostile takeovers in general, such as some states in the U. S., there is a risk of casting restriction on hostile takeovers in some particular industries by individual statutes regulating those industries.

本研究项目的目的是分析(1)日本和美国敌意收购法律之间的差异，(2)造成差异的原因，以及(3)我们需要使我们的收购法律更好。我表明：(1)两国法律之间最重要的区别是，美国（特拉华州）明确采用了以董事会为中心的模式，而日本法律并没有明确采用或拒绝这种模式。(2)基本模式的差异来自两国敌意收购规则制定过程的差异，以及两国利益主体权力和分配的差异。至于日本，虽然像美国的一些州一样，通过严格限制敌意收购的法律的可能性很小，但在某些特定行业，通过规范这些行业的个别法规来限制敌意收购的风险仍然存在。