Research into the land holdings as collateral and the borrowing costraint

土地抵押及借贷成本约束研究

• 批准号: 23530369
• 负责人: MORI Nobuhiro
• 金额: $ 3.16万
• 依托单位: Nara University of Education
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2011 至 2013
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-23530369/
• 关键词: 有担保融資; 無担保融資

We examine how financial loans influence the cost functions of firms and market equilibrium, from the standpoint of industrial organization. In our model, a representative entrepreneur chooses secured or unsecured loans. The interest rate of the former is relatively low because of its collateral, but it comes with a borrowing constraint. The latter has a high interest rate stemming from a risk premium. Owing to the cost minimization by firms, these loan types affect the cost function of the entrepreneur and the output of the market.As the main results, in a short-run equilibrium, the existence of two types of financial loans leads to a discontinuous supply curve, and the possibility of non-existence of market equilibrium. If we assume a free-entry condition in the long-run, firms that choose unsecured loans and pay the risk premium cannot survive due to the severe competition stemming from free entry. We obtain a unique equilibrium in which all entrepreneurs choose secured loans.

本文从产业组织的角度考察了金融贷款对企业成本函数和市场均衡的影响。在我们的模型中，有代表性的企业家选择担保贷款或无抵押贷款。前者的利率相对较低，因为它有抵押品，但它有借贷限制。后者由于风险溢价，利率很高。由于企业的成本最小化，这些贷款类型影响了企业家的成本函数和市场的产出。作为主要结果，在短期均衡中，两类金融贷款的存在导致供给曲线不连续，并存在不存在市场均衡的可能性。如果我们假设长期的自由进入条件，选择无担保贷款并支付风险溢价的企业由于自由进入带来的激烈竞争而无法生存。我们得到一个独特的均衡，其中所有的企业家都选择担保贷款。

项目成果

Cost Function and Market Equilibrium : Trade-off between Borrowing Constraint and Risk Premium

成本函数和市场均衡：借贷约束和风险溢价之间的权衡

• 发表时间: 2014
• 期刊: Kobe City University of Foreign Studies Working Paper Series
• 作者: Tomoda;Y.;and Okamura;M
• 通讯作者: M

Bank Consolidation and Soft Information Acquisition in Small Business Lending

• DOI: 10.1007/s10693-013-0163-5
• 发表时间: 2014-04
• 期刊: Journal of Financial Services Research
• 影响因子: 1.4
• 作者: Yoshiaki Ogura;H. Uchida

Network-Motivated Lending Decision

网络驱动的贷款决策

• 发表时间: 2013
• 作者: Ogura;Y.;Okui;R.;and Y. U. Saito
• 通讯作者: and Y. U. Saito

Partial tax coordination in a repeated game setting

• DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.02.004
• 发表时间: 2014-06-01
• 期刊: EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• 影响因子: 2
• 作者: Itaya, Jun-ichi;Okamura, Makoto;Yamaguchi, Chikara
• 通讯作者: Yamaguchi, Chikara

Certification Role of Pre-IPO Bank Relationships: Evidence from Japanese IPO Underpricing

首次公开募股前银行关系的认证作用：来自日本首次公开募股抑价的证据

• 发表时间: 2014
• 作者: 堀雅博;岩本光一郎;古家弘幸;Shigeo Muto;平川均;Kazuya NAKAMIZO;Yoshiaki Ogura
• 通讯作者: Yoshiaki Ogura