Incomplete Information Models for Industrial Organisation

兼并、收购和串通行为发生在不完全竞争的环境中，在这种环境中，企业对其他企业的信息不完全。尽管如此，分析相关竞争效应的标准主力模型假设企业拥有完整的信息，并且通常只适应市场一侧的不完全竞争。本项目旨在通过发展经济理论和相关的实用工具来弥补这一不足，以分析双方在不完全信息和市场力量的情况下的竞争效果。项目工作将在地球仪的研讨会和讲习班上向学术界和竞争主管机构的从业人员介绍。

Mergers, acquisitions, and collusive conduct take place in imperfectly competitive environments where firms have incomplete information about others. Despite this, standard workhorse models for analyzing the associated competitive effects assume that firms have complete information and typically only accommodate imperfect competition on one side of the market. This project aims to remedy this deficiency by developing the economic theory and associated practical tools for the analysis of competitive effects in settings with incomplete information and market power on both sides. The project work will be presented at seminars and workshops around the globe to both academic audiences and to practitioners at competition authorities.