Justification and Probability

理由和概率

• 批准号: AH/L009633/1
• 负责人: Martin Smith
• 金额: $ 8.09万
• 依托单位: University of Glasgow
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Fellowship
• 财政年份: 2014
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2014 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FL009633%2F1
• 关键词: Justification; Probability

Under what conditions are we justified in believing something? A very simple and natural answer to this question is that we are justified in believing something when it is sufficiently likely to be true. Managing one's beleiefs in a reasonable and responsible manner is all about minimising the risk of error. As simple and natural as this answer seems, however, I believe it to be mistaken.Suppose that 100 people attended a concert but we know that only one ticket was ever sold. As such, we know that only one of the people at the concert attended legitimately and the other 99 were gatecrashers. Suppose we know that Joe was one of the people who attended the concert but have no further information about him. Clearly, in light of our evidence, it's very likely that Joe was a gatecrasher. But should I really draw the conclusion that Joe was a gatecrasher and treat him accordingly? Should I go about asserting that Joe was a gatecrasher - should I inform his friends, his family, his employer for instance? Should Joe be arrested and convicted and appropriate punishment applied to him? Most of us would agree that this would be exceedingly unfair and, under prevailing legal practice, statistical evidence of this kind would not be deemed a legitimate basis for a conviction.But if I'm not justified in believing that Joe was a gatecrasher, then justification is not simply a matter of likelihood after all - there must be more to it than this. Interestingly, if an eye-witness claimed that she saw Joe scaling the fence to get into the concert then we would generally have no qualms about believing that Joe was a gatecrasher and acting accordingly - and such evidence could well be deemed a legitimate basis for conviction in a court. And yet, we're all aware that testimony is fallible - the eye-witness could be lying or mistaken. Indeed the probability that Joe was a gatecrasher given that a witness testified that she saw him scaling a fence is plausibly not as high as 99%. My primary aim in this project is to try and get to the bottom of this puzzle and, in so doing, come to a new understanding of what it takes to be justified in believing something. The research is relevant not just to epistemologists and academic philosophers but to anyone who has wondered what to believe about a given topic or how to evaluate a given piece of evidence. As the above example suggests, the research also has a bearing on questions about how best to understand and rationalise our legal practices. I aim to publish the results of this research in a monograph and a research paper. The research will be conducted primarily in Scotland and in collaboration with a number of philosophers working throughout Scotland. Scotland, at present, boasts a number of high profile philosophy departments and research centres with particular strength in epistemology.

在什么情况下，我们有理由相信某事？这个问题的一个非常简单和自然的答案是，当某事很有可能是真的时，我们有理由相信它。以合理和负责任的方式管理自己的信念，完全是为了将出错的风险降到最低。尽管这个答案看起来简单自然，但我认为它是错误的。假设有100人参加了一场音乐会，但我们知道只卖出了一张票。因此，我们知道，参加音乐会的人中只有一人是合法出席的，其余99人是闯入者。假设我们知道乔是参加音乐会的人之一，但没有关于他的进一步消息。很明显，根据我们的证据，乔很有可能是个不速之客。但我真的应该得出乔是个擅自闯入的人的结论，并相应地对待他吗？我应该断言乔是个破坏者吗--比如，我应该通知他的朋友、家人、雇主吗？乔应该被逮捕和定罪，并对他施加适当的惩罚吗？我们中的大多数人都会同意，这将是非常不公平的，根据现行的法律实践，这种统计证据不会被认为是定罪的合法基础。但如果我没有理由相信乔是一个破门而入的人，那么理由毕竟不仅仅是可能性的问题--肯定还有比这更重要的原因。有趣的是，如果目击者声称她看到乔翻过栅栏进入演唱会，那么我们通常会毫不犹豫地相信乔是一个破坏者，并采取相应的行动--这样的证据很可能被认为是法庭定罪的合法依据。然而，我们都知道，证词是容易出错的--目击者可能是撒谎的，也可能是错误的。事实上，考虑到一名目击者作证说她看到乔翻过栅栏，乔是一个破坏门户的人的可能性似乎不会高达99%。我在这个项目中的主要目标是试图找出这个谜题的真相，并在这样做的过程中，对如何才能证明相信某事是合理的有了新的理解。这项研究不仅与认识论和学术哲学家有关，而且还与任何想知道对给定主题相信什么或如何评估给定证据的人有关。正如上面的例子所表明的那样，这项研究还关系到如何最好地理解我们的法律实践并使其合理化的问题。我的目标是以专著和研究论文的形式发表这项研究的结果。这项研究将主要在苏格兰进行，并与一些在苏格兰各地工作的哲学家合作进行。目前，苏格兰拥有一批在认识论方面特别有实力的知名哲学系和研究中心。

项目成果

The Hardest Paradox for Closure

关闭最难的悖论

• 发表时间: 2020
• 期刊: Erkenntnis
• 影响因子: 0.9
• 作者: Smith, M.

More on Normic Support and the Criminal Standard of Proof

有关规范支持和刑事证明标准的更多信息

• DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab005
• 发表时间: 2021
• 期刊: Mind
• 影响因子: 1.8
• 作者: Smith M

Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief

在概率和确定性之间：什么证明了信念的合理性

• 发表时间: 2016
• 作者: M Smith

The logic of epistemic justification.

认知论证的逻辑。

• DOI: 10.1007/s11229-017-1422-z
• 发表时间: 2018
• 期刊: Synthese
• 影响因子: 1.5
• 作者: Smith M

When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?

• DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzx026
• 发表时间: 2018-10-01
• 期刊: MIND
• 影响因子: 1.8
• 作者: Smith, Martin