African Digital Rights Network

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Since the beginning of the century Africa has experienced a rapid expansion in the use of mobile and internet technologies, which have produced digital dividends for some in the form of improved social and economic development (Buskens and Webb 2014; World Bank 2016; WSIS 2018). However, research also clearly shows that the use of digital technologies is creating new exclusions and digital divides both between and within countries that reflect and reinforce racism, and amplify and automate existing inequalities (Eubanks 2017, Noble 2018; Hernandez and Roberts 2018). Over the same timeframe, many African countries have experienced a 'closing of civic space' for open and inclusive governance (CIVICUS 2019). Mechanisms used to close civic space have included deregistering NGOs, regulations to cut off funding, violence and harassment, arbitrary arrest and disappearance of civil society actors (Dupuy et al 2016; Hossain et al 2018). During periods of closing civic space, activists forced underground or into exile have often fought back in part by opening online civic space from where their right to freedom of speech and assembly can be exercised and defended (Buyse 2018; Roberts 2019). By creating these new virtual civic spaces, tech-savvy youth movements have been able to mitigate the efforts of repressive governments to completely close civic space.The opening of civic space online has been characterised by hashtag campaigns, viral memes, and civic technologies as mechanisms for digital rights advocacy (Nyabola 2018; Solomon 2018). Online civic space has been particularly valuable for marginalised groups to voice opinion, form new counter-narratives, and offer policy alternatives (Tufekci 2017; Gurumurthy et al 2017). However, in recent years repressive governments have begun deploying their own digital methods to close online civic space. Mechanisms to close online civic space have included internet shutdowns, online surveillance and digital disinformation. Governments have hired private companies like Cambridge Analytica to deploy psychological profiling and micro-targeting of voters with 'fake news', DDOS denial of service attacks, and computational propaganda via troll farms, cyborg networks, bot armies, and other 'coordinated inauthentic behaviour' (Bradshaw and Howard 2017; Woolley and Howard 2017; Bradshaw and Howard 2017; 2019).Members of the proposed African Digital Rights Network have made important contributions to a modest but growing literature on the use of digital technologies by African civil society in the context of closing civic space (Gagliardone 2014; Ojebode 2018; Nyabola 2018; Bosch 2019; Karekwaivanane 2019; Oosterom 2019; Roberts 2019). To date however, there is minimal research literature on the growing use of digital technologies by African governments and private companies to close civic space. The research that does exist is primarily single country studies. Most studies assess a single technology used by a single actor. There is not yet any comparative African literature to identify trends, build theory, and guide policy and practice. There has not yet been any analysis of the particular technical affordances (Gibson 1977; Norman 1988) that make specific technologies more or less appropriate at different moments of opening and closing of civic space. Addressing these research gaps is an inescapably interdisciplinary endeavour. The African Digital Rights Network will bring together a unique team of data scientists, political economists, digital ethnographers, political communications and development studies scholars. Network members will share experience, identify gaps and priorities, and define a long-term comparative research programme to push the boundaries of knowledge and understanding. The overarching research question is 'in contexts of closing civic space, how can digital technologies be used to open civic space and enable citizens to exercise their (digital) rights?'