The Post-Heroic General: military command in the 21st century

许多学者、记者和高级军官声称，伊拉克和阿富汗战役的特点是战略和作战层面的军事指挥存在缺陷。武装部队本身已经认识到这个问题，目前正在改进指挥结构，以克服最近行动中遇到的问题。具体而言，由美国领导并得到英国和法国支持的西方武装部队正在重新投资和改革师一级的指挥（大约20,000名士兵的编制），他们认为师级指挥对未来的战役具有决定性作用。本研究旨在分析和评估21世纪师级军事指挥改革。现代“联合武装”师在第一次世界大战期间出现，并持续了20世纪的大部分时间，是一个庞大而简单的组织，主要用于常规的国家间陆战。它由战斗部队组成，由炮兵支援，通常防御或攻击一个大约10英里的小战线，以对抗类似的对手。21世纪的划分是不同的。它是一个多功能组织，指挥各种陆地、空中和信息资产，在一个巨大的区域内对抗混合敌人。虽然师仍然是决定性的战术阵型，但它已经扩大和多样化。因此，它要求对指挥进行彻底改革。在分析师级指挥的这种转变时，拟议的项目特别不把重点放在作为有魅力的个人的指挥官上，而是放在社会指挥机构上，它将其定位于指挥官与其总部内工作人员之间的关系，受到更广泛的指挥系统的影响。这项研究将显示指挥是如何由指挥官及其工作人员集体构成的。具体而言，该研究旨在确定指挥官及其工作人员如何共同做出和执行决策。该研究探索并验证了命令已成为“后英雄”的论点。正是因为师的行动现在是如此复杂，涉及到在大范围的空间和时间上的多种职能，师指挥官不能再亲自指挥或领导行动，而他们在20世纪有时是英勇地这样做的。没有一个人能够协调这个复杂的组织及其职能。各师的指挥权已被分配和共享，因此出现了由高级军官组成的指挥委员会，这些高级军官向指挥官提供咨询意见，而不是由一个指挥官迅速作出个人决定。决策变得集体化，甚至官僚化；职员程序、渠道和组织指挥官的权力。为了团结日益复杂的师团，将军正日益走向“后英雄主义”。当然，指挥官对一个师来说仍然是至关重要的。正是因为它的功能如此复杂，所以必须有一个单一的和最终的权威点。在这里，个性仍然是一个师级指挥的关键，但它的形式与20世纪大不相同。它的目的不再是维持部队的士气，而是与其他机构和组织建立伙伴关系，其中许多机构和组织不是军事机构。将军不再是简单的战士，而是促进者。本研究将在档案研究的支持下，通过在英国、美国、法国和德国的多地点民族志田野调查和访谈来检验这一论点。通过这种方式，该研究将确定第21个军事司令部的显著特征，以确定其能力、需求和必要的限制。通过这种方式，该研究不仅旨在促进有关国防，武装部队，战争，组织和领导的社会和政治学的跨学科辩论，而且还有助于有关军事改革的政策讨论，并协助实践者了解今天的将军。

Many academics, journalists and senior officers have claimed that the Iraq and Afghan campaigns were characterized by flawed military command at the strategic and operational levels. The armed forces have themselves recognized the issue and are currently renovating command structures to overcome the problems experienced on recent operations. Specifically, western armed forces, led by the United States and supported by the UK and France, are re-investing in and reforming command at the divisional level (a formation of some 20,000 soldiers) which they have identified as decisive for future campaigns. This research aims to analyse and assess the reformation of military command at the divisional level in the 21st century. Emerging during the First World War and enduring for most of the 20th century, the modern 'combined armed' division was a large but simple organisation designed primarily for conventional inter-state land warfare. It consisted of combat troops supported by artillery and typically defended or attacked a small front of some ten miles against a similar opponent. The twenty-first century division is different. It is a multi-functional organization commanding diverse land, air and informational assets against hybrid enemies over a huge area. While the division remains the decisive tactical formation, it has expanded and diversified. It has consequently required a radical reformation of command.Analysing this transformation of divisional command, the proposed project distinctively focuses not on commanders as charismatic individuals but on the social institution of command, which it locates in the relations between commanders and their staff within the headquarters, influenced by the wider chain of command. The research will show how command is collectively constituted by commanders and their staff. Specifically, the research aims to identify how decisions are made and executed by commanders and their staff together.The research explores and tests a thesis that command has become 'post-heroic'. Precisely because divisional operations are now so complex involving multiple functions over large tracts of space and time, divisional commanders can no longer direct or lead operations personally, as they did - sometimes heroically - in the twentieth century. No single individual can coordinate this intricate organization and its functions. Divisional command has been distributed and shared so that in place of a single commander making rapid individual decisions, command boards consisting of senior officers, who advise the commander, have emerged. Decisions have become collective and even bureaucratised; staff procedures channel and structure the commander's authority. In order to unite the increasingly complex division, generalship is increasingly becoming 'post-heroic'.The commander is still vital to a division, of course. Precisely because its functions are so complex, there must be a single and ultimate point of authority. Here, personality remains essential to a divisional command but it takes a quite different form from the 20th century. It is no longer directed so much at sustaining the morale of troops as generating partnerships with other agencies and organisations, many of which are not military. Generals are no longer simply warriors but facilitators. The research will test this thesis through multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork and interviews in the UK, US, France and Germany, supported by archival research. In this way, the research will identify the distinguishing features of 21st military command to identify its capabilities, its requirements and its necessary limitations. In this way, the research aims to contribute not only to inter-disciplinary debates in the social and political science about defence, the armed forces, war, organizations and leadership but also to contribute to policy discussions about military reform and to assist practitioners in understanding generalship today.