The Post-Heroic General: military command in the 21st century

许多学者、记者和高级军官声称，伊拉克和阿富汗战役的特点是在战略和行动层面的军事指挥存在缺陷。武装部队本身已经认识到这一问题，目前正在更新指挥结构，以克服在最近的行动中遇到的问题。具体地说，以美国为首、英国和法国支持的西方武装部队正在重新投资和改革师一级的指挥(约2万名士兵组成)，他们认为这对未来的战役具有决定性意义。本研究旨在对21世纪师级军事指挥体制改革进行分析和评估。现代的“联合武装”师出现在第一次世界大战期间，并在20世纪的大部分时间里一直存在，它是一个庞大但简单的组织，主要为传统的国家间陆战而设计。它由火炮支援的作战部队组成，通常在大约10英里的小前线防御或攻击类似的对手。21世纪的划分是不同的。它是一个多功能组织，指挥着不同的陆地、空中和信息资产，在大片区域内对抗混合敌人。虽然该师仍然是决定性的战术编队，但它已经扩大和多样化。因此，需要对指挥部进行彻底的改革。在分析师级指挥部的这一转变时，拟议的项目显然不是把指挥官作为有魅力的个人，而是把重点放在指挥的社会制度上，它位于指挥部内指挥官与其工作人员之间的关系中，受到更广泛的指挥链的影响。这项研究将展示指挥部如何由指挥官及其参谋人员集体构成。具体地说，这项研究旨在确定指挥官和他们的工作人员是如何共同做出和执行决策的。这项研究探索并测试了一个命题，即指挥权已经变成了“后英雄主义”。正因为师的行动现在是如此复杂，涉及大片空间和时间的多种职能，师指挥官不再像他们在20世纪所做的那样，亲自指挥或领导行动--有时是英勇的。没有任何个人能够协调这一错综复杂的组织及其职能。各师的指挥权已经分散和共享，因此出现了由高级军官组成的指挥委员会，他们向指挥官提供建议，而不是由一个指挥官迅速地做出个人决定。决策已经成为集体的，甚至官僚化的；工作人员程序引导和构建指挥官的权威。为了团结日益复杂的师，将军的头衔正变得越来越“后英雄主义”。当然，指挥官对一个师仍然至关重要。正因为它的职能如此复杂，所以必须有一个单一的和最终的权威点。在这里，个性对于一个师的指挥来说仍然是必不可少的，但它采取了与20世纪截然不同的形式。与其说它是为了维持军队的士气，不如说是为了与其他机构和组织建立伙伴关系，其中许多机构和组织不是军方的。将军们不再是简单的战士，而是调解人。这项研究将通过在英国、美国、法国和德国的多地点民族志田野调查和访谈来检验这一论点，并得到档案研究的支持。通过这种方式，研究将确定21世纪军事指挥的特点，以确定其能力、要求和必要的限制。通过这种方式，这项研究的目的不仅是促进社会和政治学中关于国防、武装部队、战争、组织和领导力的跨学科辩论，而且还有助于关于军事改革的政策讨论，并帮助实践者理解当今的将军称号。

Many academics, journalists and senior officers have claimed that the Iraq and Afghan campaigns were characterized by flawed military command at the strategic and operational levels. The armed forces have themselves recognized the issue and are currently renovating command structures to overcome the problems experienced on recent operations. Specifically, western armed forces, led by the United States and supported by the UK and France, are re-investing in and reforming command at the divisional level (a formation of some 20,000 soldiers) which they have identified as decisive for future campaigns. This research aims to analyse and assess the reformation of military command at the divisional level in the 21st century. Emerging during the First World War and enduring for most of the 20th century, the modern 'combined armed' division was a large but simple organisation designed primarily for conventional inter-state land warfare. It consisted of combat troops supported by artillery and typically defended or attacked a small front of some ten miles against a similar opponent. The twenty-first century division is different. It is a multi-functional organization commanding diverse land, air and informational assets against hybrid enemies over a huge area. While the division remains the decisive tactical formation, it has expanded and diversified. It has consequently required a radical reformation of command.Analysing this transformation of divisional command, the proposed project distinctively focuses not on commanders as charismatic individuals but on the social institution of command, which it locates in the relations between commanders and their staff within the headquarters, influenced by the wider chain of command. The research will show how command is collectively constituted by commanders and their staff. Specifically, the research aims to identify how decisions are made and executed by commanders and their staff together.The research explores and tests a thesis that command has become 'post-heroic'. Precisely because divisional operations are now so complex involving multiple functions over large tracts of space and time, divisional commanders can no longer direct or lead operations personally, as they did - sometimes heroically - in the twentieth century. No single individual can coordinate this intricate organization and its functions. Divisional command has been distributed and shared so that in place of a single commander making rapid individual decisions, command boards consisting of senior officers, who advise the commander, have emerged. Decisions have become collective and even bureaucratised; staff procedures channel and structure the commander's authority. In order to unite the increasingly complex division, generalship is increasingly becoming 'post-heroic'.The commander is still vital to a division, of course. Precisely because its functions are so complex, there must be a single and ultimate point of authority. Here, personality remains essential to a divisional command but it takes a quite different form from the 20th century. It is no longer directed so much at sustaining the morale of troops as generating partnerships with other agencies and organisations, many of which are not military. Generals are no longer simply warriors but facilitators. The research will test this thesis through multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork and interviews in the UK, US, France and Germany, supported by archival research. In this way, the research will identify the distinguishing features of 21st military command to identify its capabilities, its requirements and its necessary limitations. In this way, the research aims to contribute not only to inter-disciplinary debates in the social and political science about defence, the armed forces, war, organizations and leadership but also to contribute to policy discussions about military reform and to assist practitioners in understanding generalship today.