The gender gap in pay progression: job mobility and job ladders

在英国，性别收入差距中位数从1970年代的36.4% （O'Reilly, Smith et al. 2015）急剧下降到最新数据中的18%左右（ONS 2018）。尽管如此，按照国际标准，英国的性别工资差距仍然很大：英国在欧盟中排名第四，在经合组织国家中排名第八（经合组织2019年）。研究人员和政策制定者一直关注教育和劳动力市场经验方面的性别差异，认为这可能是造成薪酬差距的原因。然而，今天这些解释已经经不起推敲了。女性平均受教育程度比男性高，她们长期退出劳动力市场的可能性要小得多。尽管如此，女性的平均收入比男性低10%左右，即使她们是全职工作，并且拥有相似的教育和劳动力市场经验。尽管对女性潜在的低生产率作为性别薪酬差距原因的解释进行了彻底调查，但发现不足，但关于雇主所起作用的证据较少。这项研究将有助于解决这一差距。劳动力市场的标准经济模型假设，工资是由市场决定的，而个体雇主无法选择他们为员工提供的工资。另一种模型假设，由于种种原因，竞争并不完美，雇主对他们提供的工资有一定的自由裁量权。当工人流动时，这种设定工资的权力可能会减弱。流动工人将离开雇主提供的低于市场水平的工资。然而，如果工人的流动性相对较低，雇主可以通过提供较低的工资来利用这种“流动性”。如果妇女在她们将从事的工作类型或她们可以用于寻找工作的时间和精力方面受到家庭责任的更多限制，她们通常会更加不灵活，从而处于不利地位。女性的家庭责任可能是男女薪酬差距的最终原因，但不是因为它们限制了她们的生产力，而是因为它们降低了她们与公司讨价还价的能力。这个研究项目将从两个方面考察雇主制定工资的权力在推动性别工资差距方面的作用。首先，它将利用英国规模最大的纵向研究的数据，调查男女之间工作间流动模式的差异程度，以及这种差异是否可以解释在薪酬增长方面观察到的性别差距。其次，它将根据地理位置、行业和旅行成本制定雇主工资设定权力指数，并测试该指数是否能解释薪酬增长中的性别差异。解决性别薪酬差距是政策制定者、政党、妇女团体、工会和雇主组织的一个广泛共同目标。更好地了解造成这一差距的因素对于制定有效的政策至关重要。例如，2017年4月，英国政府要求大型雇主每年报告其组织内的薪酬差距。如果把性别收入差距归咎于女性的低生产率，那么这样的立法很可能是无效的，甚至适得其反。另一方面，如果雇主更强的工资设定权力是工资差距背后的一个重要因素，强制性报告可能会更有效。更普遍的是，如果雇主相对于某些雇员享有很大的工资设定权，这将对反歧视、最低工资、工会和家庭政策的立法产生影响。

The median gender pay gap has declined dramatically in the UK from 36.4% in the 1970 (O'Reilly, Smith et al. 2015) to around 18% in the most recent data (ONS 2018). Still, by international standards the pay gap is high: the UK has the fourth largest gender pay gap in the EU and the eighth largest of OECD countries (OECD 2019). Researchers and policy makers have focused on gender differences in education and labour market experience as the likely drivers of the pay gap. However, today these explanations no longer stand up to scrutiny. Women are on average better educated than men and they are much less likely to withdraw from the labour market for long periods of time. Nevertheless, women earn on average about 10% less than men even when they work full-time and have similar education and labour market experience. While explanations focusing on women's potential lower productivity as the cause of the gender pay gap have been thoroughly investigated and found inadequate, there is less evidence on the role played by employers. This research will contribute to addressing this gap. The standard economic model of the labour market assumes that wages are determined by the market and that individual employers cannot choose the wages they offer to their employees. A different model assumes that for a variety of reasons competition is not perfect and employers have some discretion over the wages they offer. This wage setting power is likely to be weaker when workers are mobile. Mobile workers will leave an employer offering wages below the market rate. However, if workers are relatively immobile, employers can exploit this 'immobility' by offering them lower wages. If women are more constrained by family responsibilities in the types of jobs that they will take-up or in the amount of time and effort they can devote to job search, they will generally be more immobile and thus at a disadvantage. Women's family responsibilities might be ultimately responsible for the gender pay gap but not because they limit their productivity but rather because they reduce their bargaining power with firms.This research project will examine the role of employer wage-setting power in driving the gender pay gap in two ways. First, using data from the UK's largest longitudinal study, it will investigate the extent to which job-to-job mobility patterns differ between men and women, and whether any differences can explain the observed gender gap in pay progression. Second, it will develop an index of employer wage-setting power based on geographical location, industry and cost of travel and test whether the index can explain gender differences in pay progression.Tackling the gender pay gap is a widely shared goal among policy makers, political parties, women's groups, trade-unions and employer organizations. A better understanding of the factors driving the gap is essential to design effective policies. For example, in April 2017, the UK government has mandated large employers report annually on the pay gap in their organization. If women's lower productivity is to blame for the gender pay gap, such legislation is likely to be ineffective and even counterproductive. On the other hand, mandatory reporting is likely to be more effective if employers' stronger wage-setting power is a significant factor behind the pay gap. More generally, if employers enjoy significant wage setting power relative to some of their employees, this has implications for legislation on anti-discrimination, the minimum wage, trade-unions and family policy.