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Nonviolent Repression in Electoral Autocracies

选举独裁政权的非暴力镇压

基本信息

批准号：
ES/V012207/1
负责人：
Katerina Tertytchnaya
金额：
$ 32.5万
依托单位：
University College London
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Research Grant
财政年份：
2021
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2021 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FV012207%2F1
关键词：
Nonviolent Repression Electoral Autocracies

项目摘要

Contemporary autocrats, such as Russia's Vladimir Putin, and Turkey's Tayyip Erdogan are said to rule by 'velvet fist'. Instead of relying on Stalinist methods of brutal repression, they use the law to manage protests. Understanding how nonviolent strategies of repression influence authoritarian stability and democratic retrenchment constitutes one of the most pressing and policy relevant challenges facing political science today. Yet, comparative politics research remains focused on authoritarianism's variants from several decades ago. While studies of authoritarian politics are beholden to analyses of repression that examine brutal force and coercion, nonviolent repression strategies remain poorly understood. To date, for example, researchers (and policy makers) know little about the effect of draconian protest laws on opposition and voter coordination in nondemocratic regimes.This project studies how one commonly used, yet poorly understood strategy of nonviolent repression - the use of protest notifications - influences coordination between different types of opposition parties and voters in electoral autocracies. Electoral autocracies are regimes that combine authoritarian practices with multiparty elections and the dominant form of nondemocracy today. This is the first study to empirically tackle the effect of nonviolent repression on opposition parties and voters in these regimes. I propose that while opposition and voter coordination is an important component of successful collective action, the ability to form coalitions in electoral autocracies is strongly shaped by the ruling regime. Protest notifications are a powerful and insidious tool that allows autocrats to divide their opponents. Under certain conditions, I argue, protest notifications can prevent coordination between 'extremist' and 'moderate' opposition groups, dampening popular support for the organisers of unauthorised protests, those that go ahead without a permit. The argument helps us better understand how repression operates in contemporary autocracies, and why, in order to prevent opposition and voter coordination, governments with the capacity to prevent protests often commit to repression strategies that create weak deterrence incentives. The project's theoretical focus allows me to discuss the preferences and constraints of key groups in authoritarian politics - those of the authorities, 'extremist' and 'moderate' opposition groups, and voters. To test the effect of protest notifications on opposition and voter coordination, I will leverage empirical evidence from contemporary Russia. Russia is a country of great importance for British and EU foreign policy, and of the world's largest and most influential electoral autocracies. Building on two successful pilot studies, I will produce two new datasets. The first dataset will collect information on protest notifications submitted to city authorities, and match this information to news about authorised and unauthorised protests taking place in Russia from January 2019 to March 2024. Using this dataset, I will test whether the probability of two or more 'moderate' and 'extremist' opposition groups (i) co-signing a protest notification, and (ii) participating in the same protest changes as a function of prior levels of nonviolent repression. I will also collect original survey data that allow me to study voters' views of 'extremist' and 'moderate' opposition parties and activists, and their propensity to participate in protests with groups and activists perceived as either 'extremists' or 'moderates'. The project is interdisciplinary in nature. It builds on, and impacts research on comparative politics and sociology; social psychology and political behaviour; and survey methodology. Beyond academia, findings will be of interest to institutions and organisations that monitory human rights' violations and changes in civic spaces around the world - such as Civicus and Human Rights Watch.

当代的独裁者，如俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京和土耳其总统塔伊普·埃尔多安，都被认为是“天鹅绒拳头”。他们没有依靠斯大林式的残酷镇压，而是用法律来管理抗议活动。理解非暴力镇压策略如何影响威权稳定和民主紧缩，是当今政治学面临的最紧迫和与政策相关的挑战之一。然而，比较政治学研究仍然集中在几十年前威权主义的变体上。虽然对威权政治的研究受制于对镇压的分析，这些分析考察了残酷的武力和胁迫，但非暴力的镇压策略仍然鲜为人知。例如，到目前为止，研究人员(和政策制定者)对严厉的抗议法对非民主政体中的反对派和选民协调的影响知之甚少。这个项目研究了一种常用但鲜为人知的非暴力镇压策略--抗议通知的使用--如何影响不同类型的反对党和选举独裁国家选民之间的协调。选举专制是将威权做法与多党选举相结合的政权，也是当今占主导地位的非民主形式。这是第一项经验性地处理非暴力镇压对这些政权中的反对党和选民的影响的研究。我认为，虽然反对派和选民协调是成功的集体行动的重要组成部分，但在选举专制国家中组建联盟的能力强烈地受到统治政权的影响。抗议通知是一种强大而阴险的工具，让独裁者可以分裂他们的对手。我认为，在某些情况下，抗议通知可能会阻止“极端主义”和“温和”反对派团体之间的协调，从而抑制民众对未经授权抗议活动组织者的支持，即那些未经许可继续进行的抗议活动。这一论点有助于我们更好地理解镇压在当代独裁国家中是如何运作的，以及为什么有能力阻止抗议活动的政府为了防止反对派和选民协调，往往致力于产生薄弱的威慑激励的镇压战略。该项目的理论重点使我能够讨论威权政治中关键群体的偏好和限制--当局、极端和温和派反对派团体以及选民的偏好和限制。为了测试抗议通知对反对派和选民协调的影响，我将利用当代俄罗斯的经验证据。俄罗斯是英国和欧盟外交政策的重要国家，也是世界上最大和最有影响力的选举独裁国家之一。在两个成功的试点研究的基础上，我将产生两个新的数据集。第一个数据集将收集提交给城市当局的抗议通知信息，并将这些信息与2019年1月至2024年3月俄罗斯发生的未经授权和未经授权的抗议活动的新闻进行匹配。使用这个数据集，我将测试两个或两个以上“温和派”和“极端主义”反对派团体(I)共同签署抗议通知，以及(Ii)参与相同抗议活动的可能性是否随着先前非暴力镇压水平的变化而发生变化。我还将收集原始调查数据，使我能够研究选民对“极端主义”和“温和派”反对党和活动人士的看法，以及他们参与被视为“极端分子”或“温和派”的团体和活动人士的抗议倾向。该项目本质上是跨学科的。它建立在比较政治学和社会学、社会心理学和政治行为以及调查方法研究的基础上，并对其产生影响。除了学术界，监测世界各地公民空间侵犯人权行为和变化的机构和组织--如Civicus和人权观察--也会对此感兴趣。