Presidents' Personalities and Nuclear Decision-Making in Iran

总统性格与伊朗核决策

• 批准号: ES/W006057/1
• 负责人: Ameneh Mehvar
• 金额: $ 12.6万
• 依托单位: University of Birmingham
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Fellowship
• 财政年份: 2021
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2021 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FW006057%2F1
• 关键词: Presidents; Personalities; Nuclear; Decision; Making

Since August 2002, when an Iranian exiled opposition group revealed that the Islamic Republic had secretly built two nuclear facilities, Iran's nuclear program has become a central concern of the international non-proliferation agenda. Iran insists on the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. But the international community has suspected a covert effort by Iran to acquire a nuclear arms capability, and employed over a decade of coercive diplomacy to bring its indigenous nuclear fuel cycle activities to a halt. Iran refused to indefinitely halt its nuclear program despite sanctions and mounting economic pressure. This refusal has been attributed to the country's intention to retain a latent nuclear weapons capability as deterrent against military attacks, as well as the pursuit of prestigious, justice and independence.However, one does not only observe continuity in Iran's nuclear policies, but also change. Under the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, Iran agreed to temporarily suspend its enrichment activities between 2003 and 2005. Once again, Iran accepted significant limits on its nuclear program following the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) almost a decade later under President Rouhani. For several years in between though, Iran uncompromisingly ramped up its fuel cycle activities, rejecting even weeks long moratorium on uranium enrichment, coinciding with the tenure of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. This change in behaviour is the focus of my PhD thesis. Using the methods of political psychology, I demonstrate that the three Iranian presidents Khatami, Ahmadinejad, and Rouhani have significantly different personalities in terms of their beliefs and leadership styles. In a detailed single-country case study, these differences in personalities are shown to have impacted the change in Iran's nuclear decisions. This research challenges the narrative, often presented by American neo-conservatives and Israeli officials, that Iran is a monolithic and dictatorial theocracy, where alone the whims of the Supreme Leader dictate all policy outcomes. Basic national attributes or regime structure do not automatically determine the foreign policy decision-making in a country. This means that contrary to the commonly held view, decision-making in Western democracies is not always a pluralistic process, neither are policies always determined by a predominant leader's personal predispositions in non-democratic countries. My research vividly demonstrates that foreign policy decision-making in Iran is mostly a pluralistic process, with the office of presidency a significant force that can impact decision outcomes. A moderate and seasoned Iranian president can play a positive role in adopting cooperative foreign policies, constructive engagement with the international community, and normalising relations with the West. Policies such as Clinton's dual containment policies, Bush's labelling Iran as a member of the "axis of evils", and Trump's maximum pressure policy -- all implemented at a time of moderate Iranian administrations -- only boosted Iran's hardliners and undermined the chances of rapprochement and de-escalation of tensions. My thesis can help prevent similar mistakes being made in the future.Drawing on the findings of my PhD thesis, this fellowship aims to produce three journal articles, as well as short online pieces and blog posts to disseminate the results within and beyond academia. Together, these publications will provide insights into the development of Iran nuclear crisis since 2003, the process of nuclear decision-making in Iran, the role of the presidency in decision-making, and the personalities of three Iranian presidents. These insights will be of interest to academics, policymakers, and all those interested in Iran and Iranian affairs.

2002年8月，一个流亡的伊朗反对派团体透露，伊朗伊斯兰共和国秘密建造了两座核设施，自那时以来，伊朗的核计划已成为国际不扩散议程的一个核心关切。伊朗坚持其核计划的和平性质。但国际社会一直怀疑伊朗在秘密努力获得核武器能力，并采用了十多年的胁迫外交手段，使其本土的核燃料循环活动停止。尽管受到制裁和越来越大的经济压力，伊朗拒绝无限期地停止核计划。这种拒绝被认为是因为该国打算保留潜在的核武器能力，作为对军事攻击的威慑，以及追求声望、正义和独立，然而，人们看到的不仅是伊朗核政策的连续性，而且是变化的。在穆罕默德·哈塔米的总统任期内，伊朗同意在2003年至2005年期间暂停其浓缩活动。在鲁哈尼总统领导下的联合全面行动计划（JCPOA）达成近十年后，伊朗再次接受了对其核计划的重大限制。然而，在这之间的几年里，伊朗毫不妥协地加强了其燃料循环活动，甚至拒绝了长达数周的铀浓缩暂停，与马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪内贾德的任期相吻合。这种行为上的变化是我博士论文的重点。使用政治心理学的方法，我证明了三个伊朗总统哈塔米，艾哈迈迪内贾德和鲁哈尼有显着不同的个性，在他们的信仰和领导风格。在一项详细的单一国家案例研究中，这些个性差异显示出对伊朗核决定的变化产生了影响。这项研究挑战了美国新保守主义者和以色列官员经常提出的说法，即伊朗是一个铁板一块的独裁神权国家，只有最高领袖的突发奇想才能决定所有的政策结果。基本的国家属性或政权结构并不能自动决定一个国家的外交决策。这意味着与普遍持有的观点相反，西方民主国家的决策并不总是一个多元化的过程，在非民主国家，政策也不总是由主要领导人的个人倾向决定。我的研究生动地表明，伊朗的外交政策决策在很大程度上是一个多元化的过程，总统职位是影响决策结果的重要力量。一位温和而老练的伊朗总统可以在采取合作外交政策、与国际社会进行建设性接触以及与西方关系正常化方面发挥积极作用。克林顿的双重遏制政策，布什将伊朗列为“邪恶轴心”成员以及特朗普的最大压力政策等政策-所有这些都是在温和的伊朗政府时期实施的-只会助长伊朗的强硬派，破坏和解和缓和紧张局势的机会。我的论文可以帮助防止类似的错误在未来发生。利用我的博士论文的发现，这个奖学金的目的是产生三个期刊文章，以及简短的在线文章和博客文章，以传播学术界内外的结果。这些出版物将共同提供自2003年以来伊朗核危机的发展，伊朗核决策过程，总统在决策中的作用以及三位伊朗总统的个性。这些见解将对学者，政策制定者以及所有对伊朗和伊朗事务感兴趣的人感兴趣。