RETIREMENT AND MARITAL BARGAINING

描述(改编自申请人的摘要)：经济模型 退休行为通常检查单个 在其余生中面临另一种效用流的个人 或者她的生命。然而，总的来说，退休人员并不是孤立的个人； 老年夫妇的劳动力供应和消费决策将是结果 一些共同的决策过程，反映了偏好和 夫妻双方的利益。退休生活中的许多重要问题 行为涉及这样的情况，在这种情况下， 已婚男女的需要和目标，包括 老年寡妇普遍贫困及其可能的后果 个人对社会保障资产的控制。一个适当的框架， 对这些问题和其他问题的分析必须考虑到独立的偏好 丈夫和妻子以及因死亡或死亡而解除婚姻或 离婚。近年来，家庭决策的博弈论模型， 包括合作和非合作讨价还价模型，已经被 发展起来并得到了相当大的实证支持，但几乎没有 对退休研究的影响。这个项目的目的是开发 一些简单的婚姻讨价还价模型，适用于储蓄和 ，并进行一些探索性的实证分析 这些决定的婚姻背景使用PSID。初步工作表明， 讨价还价模型可能有助于解释一些经验谜题，例如 消费概况未能与个人生命周期相对应 模特和65岁的过度退休。谈判框架还包括 表明家庭特征通常不包括在储蓄和 退休模式，如婚姻状况、丈夫的相对年龄和 妻子和成年子女的存在会影响行为。这些 对退休的标准经验分析的扩展可以用来测试 谈判问题在这一重要领域的相关性，并将表明 是否进一步发展讨价还价的方法来对待老年人的行为 情侣是理所当然的。

DESCRIPTION (Adapted from the Applicant's Abstract): Economic models of retirement behavior typically examine the optimal behavior of a single individual who faces alternative streams of utility over the remainder of his or her life. In general, however, retirees are not isolated individuals; the labor supply and consumption decisions of elderly couples will be the outcome of some joint decision-making process that reflects the preferences and interests of both husband and wife. Many of the important issues in retirement behavior involve circumstances in which there may be a conflict between the needs and objectives of married men and women, including the causes of extensive poverty among elderly widows and the possible consequences of individual control over Social Security assets. An appropriate framework for analyses of these and other issues must allow for the independent preferences of husbands and wives and for the dissolution of a marriage through death or divorce. In recent years, game-theoretic models of family decision-making, including cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining models, have been developed and have received considerable empirical support, but have had little influence on the study of retirement. The purpose of this project is to develop some simple models of marital bargaining with applications to savings and retirement decisions, and to conduct some exploratory empirical analysis of the marital context of these decisions using the PSID. Preliminary work shows that bargaining models may help to explain some empirical puzzles, such as the failure of consumption profiles to correspond to the individual life-cycle model and excessive retirement at age 65. The bargaining framework also suggests that household characteristics not usually included in savings and retirement models, such as marital status, the relative ages of husbands and wives, and the presence of adult children will affect behavior. These extensions to standard empirical analyses of retirement can be used to test for the relevance of bargaining issues in this important area, and will indicate whether further development of a bargaining approach to the behavior of elderly couples is warranted.