Heterogeneity and complexity in collaborative biosecurity schemes

协作生物安全方案的异质性和复杂性

• 批准号: NE/T003936/1
• 负责人: Jonathan Pitchford
• 金额: $ 6.35万
• 依托单位: University of York
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Research Grant
• 财政年份: 2019
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2019 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=NE%2FT003936%2F1
• 关键词: Heterogeneity; complexity; collaborative; biosecurity; schemes

Plant diseases threaten ecosystem and landscape health. When new disease threats emerge they can cost millions of pounds to contain and eradicate, and their wider social costs can be several times higher. Proactive biosecurity actions, including increased hygiene and monitoring for example, can reduce this threat, but in doing so they give rise to new problems: how can a government incentivise such actions, and how can it prevent free-riding where some agents reap the global benefits of others' increased biosecurity without incurring the additional cost? Simple mathematical models offer useful insights. By setting up appropriate equations governing known costs and random benefits, and optimising strategies for both the government and for each individual agent, it is possible to show how Private-Public Partnerships (PPPs), where governments both invest in biosecurity and offer outbreak compensation to agents who do likewise, can be an effective management option. However, current models are idealised, considering identical agents and averaged interactions which do not reflect the diverse landscape of agents and networks. By engaging with stakeholders and applying a range of numerical simulations and statistical analyses, this research programme will bridge that gap and help prioritise interventions.Our aim is to test the practicality of PPPs across a range of potential disease scenarios and stakeholder groups, by extending the existing theory to heterogeneous agents interacting in diverse and realistic ways. We will do this by addressing four linked objectives: (1) evaluate the effects of heterogeneity and landscape complexity in PPPs, (2) identify effective management policies in the face of asymmetric information in PPPs, (3) evaluate how the lasting impacts of biosecurity investments may influence the predicted best management strategies, and (4) understand how biosecurity coalitions form, and how and when they might be maintained to provide efficient global benefits.As well as being of academic interest to the communities seeking to understand and minimise risk in complex systems subject to uncertain inputs, we will work with a range of stakeholders to translate our mathematical and numerical results into practical outcomes. Natural beneficiaries include public bodies (such as Defra, Environment Agency, Natural England and its devolved equivalents) but will also include private industry groupings (such as crop producers, arbori- and horti-culturalists, and importers). Furthermore, the general mathematical framework is flexible and wider opportunities (for example, in marine diseases and invasive species) will be explored.

植物病害威胁生态系统和景观健康。当新的疾病威胁出现时，它们可能会花费数百万英镑来控制和根除，其更广泛的社会成本可能会高出几倍。主动的生物安全行动，例如加强卫生和监测，可以减少这种威胁，但这样做会带来新的问题：政府如何激励这种行动，如何防止搭便车，一些代理人在不招致额外成本的情况下从其他代理人提高生物安全的全球利益中获益？简单的数学模型提供了有用的见解。通过建立控制已知成本和随机收益的适当方程，并优化政府和每个单独病原体的战略，有可能展示公私伙伴关系(PPP)--政府既投资于生物安全，又向这样做的病原体提供暴发补偿--如何成为一种有效的管理选择。然而，目前的模型是理想化的，考虑了相同的代理和平均的交互，没有反映代理和网络的多样化格局。通过与利益相关者接触并应用一系列数值模拟和统计分析，该研究计划将弥合这一差距，并帮助确定干预的优先顺序。我们的目标是通过将现有理论扩展到以不同和现实的方式相互作用的不同介质，测试PPP在一系列潜在疾病情景和利益相关者群体中的实用性。我们将通过解决四个相互关联的目标来做到这一点：(1)评估PPP中异质性和景观复杂性的影响，(2)在PPP中信息不对称的情况下确定有效的管理政策，(3)评估生物安全投资的持久影响可能如何影响预测的最佳管理战略，以及(4)了解生物安全联盟是如何形成的，以及如何以及何时可以维持它们以提供有效的全球利益。除了对寻求理解和最小化复杂系统中的不确定投入的风险的社区具有学术兴趣之外，我们还将与一系列利益相关者合作，将我们的数学和数字结果转化为实际结果。自然受益者包括公共机构(如Defra、环境局、自然英格兰及其下放的对应机构)，但也将包括私营行业团体(如作物生产者、园艺师和园艺师以及进口商)。此外，总的数学框架是灵活的，将探索更广泛的机会(例如，在海洋疾病和入侵物种方面)。