Extended Nuclear Deterrence and the Restraint of Non-Nuclear Allies: Material Cooperation and Strategic Dialogue

扩大核威慑与非核盟友的克制：实质性合作与战略对话

• 批准号: DP140101478
• 负责人: Prof Andrew O'Neil
• 金额: $ 11.38万
• 依托单位: Griffith University
• 依托单位国家: 澳大利亚
• 项目类别: Discovery Projects
• 财政年份: 2014
• 资助国家: 澳大利亚
• 起止时间: 2014-05-19 至 2018-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://dataportal.arc.gov.au/RGS/Web/Grants/DP140101478
• 关键词: Extended; Nuclear; Deterrence; Restraint; Non

Extended nuclear deterrence is central to the security commitments offered by the US to its European and Asian allies, but little is known about why non-nuclear allies ask for the nuclear assurances they do and how they influence the assurances they ultimately receive. Using the lenses of intra-alliance bargaining, the role and composition of assurances, and domestic and international interactions, the project investigates why non-nuclear allies often seek modest extended nuclear deterrence guarantees when they could push for more ambitious commitments. The outcomes of the project will advance theoretical understanding of alliances, assurance and nuclear strategy, with direct relevance to foreign policy and nuclear disarmament.

延长核威慑是美国向其欧洲和亚洲盟友做出的安全承诺的核心，但人们对无核盟友为何要求它们做出核保证，以及它们如何影响它们最终得到的保证知之甚少。该项目利用联盟内部讨价还价、保证的作用和构成以及国内和国际互动的镜头，调查了为什么无核盟国在可以推动更雄心勃勃的承诺时，往往寻求适度延长的核威慑保证。该项目的成果将促进对联盟、保障和核战略的理论理解，与外交政策和核裁军直接相关。