Incentive Effects of Supplemental Security Income (SSI)

描述(申请人提供)：我们建议研究激励效果 关于老年人补充保障收入(SSI)方案的工作 在计划符合资格前几年的努力和节约活动 65岁。我们研究计划的长期目标有两个。这个 首先是大幅增加关于SSI对 利用数据分析老年贫困和近贫困人口的工作和储蓄行为 资料来源--健康和退休研究(HRS)和当前人口调查 (CPS)-提供重要优势并能够更丰富地描述 SSI的效果比我们使用收入和收入调查数据所获得的效果要好 计划参与(SIPP)。二是探索英语词汇的使用模式 SSI和社会保障提前退休(SSER)计划。关于…… 后一个目标，这些方案之间的相互作用，包括效果 一个项目的设计对参与的可取性有影响 其他的，特别令人感兴趣。 旨在实现这些长期目标的四个具体项目将是 被执行。第一个检验了我们早期发现的稳健性，并 使用替代数据源扩展了我们之前的分析，测试 假设未来的SSI接受者在SSI时工作和储蓄更少 更加慷慨。第二种是使用HRS的纵向框架来检查 个人工作努力和节省的实际时间模式，以及 利用纵向框架解决其他计量经济学问题。这个 第三，通过对关节进行建模，丰富了我们之前的方法 确定未来可能的参与者的工作努力和储蓄行为 当他们接近符合SSI资格的年龄时。第四个认识到SSER 对于接近65岁的人来说，福利可能是一种重要的经济来源 他们计划参加SSI，因此检验了可能的假设 未来的SSI接受者通常能够减少他们的工作工作量，因为 SSER程序。该项目还检查SSI政策是否鼓励使用SSER 取消社会保障中的提前退休精算扣减额 通常伴随SSER而来的好处。对于年长的穷人来说，这发生在 SSI在边际上确定了他们的政府养老转移净额。

DESCRIPTION (provided by applicant): We propose to study the incentive effects of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program for the aged on their work effort and saving activity in the years shortly before the program eligibility age of 65. The long-term objectives of our research plan are two-fold. The first is to substantially increase knowledge about the impacts of SSI on the work and saving behavior of the elderly poor and near-poor by utilizing data sources-the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the Current Population Survey (CPS)-that offer important advantages and enable a richer description of the effects of SSI than we have obtained using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The second is to explore the patterns of use of the SSI and Social Security Early Retirement (SSER) programs. With regard to the latter objective, interactions between these programs, including the effect that the design of one program has on the desirability of participation in the other, are of particular interest. Four specific projects aimed at achieving these long-term objectives will be carried out. The first examines the robustness of our earlier findings and extends our previous analysis using alternative data sources, testing the hypotheses that likely future SSI recipients work and save less when SSI is more generous. The second uses the HRS's longitudinal framework to examine the actual time patterns of the work effort and saving of individuals, and to address other econometric issues exploiting the longitudinal framework. The third enriches our previous methodological approach by modeling the joint determination of work effort and savings behavior of likely future participants as they approach the eligibility age for SSI. The fourth recognizes that SSER benefits may be an important financial resource for individuals nearing age 65 who plan to participate in SSI, and therefore tests the hypothesis that likely future SSI recipients are often able to reduce their work effort because of the SSER program. This project also examines whether SSI policy encourages SSER use by nullifying the early retirement actuarial reduction in the Social Security benefit that normally accompanies SSER. This occurs for the elderly poor when SSI determines their net government old age transfer at the margin.