The thesis proposes to answer the following question: is political liberalism undesirably individualistic?

本文拟回答以下问题：政治自由主义是否是令人不快的个人主义？

• 批准号: 2095012
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: London School of Economics and Political Science
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2018 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2095012
• 关键词: thesis; proposes; answer; following; question

It will do this by drawing on recent literature on the nature of political community and civic friendship, the way political institutions mould citizens, and state neutrality and perfectionism. The criticism that liberalism is problematically individualistic is a longstanding one. Yet this criticism has had little traction in the past two decades. I believe the main reason for this is that liberals such as John Rawls (following his political turn) and Will Kymlicka, responding to this criticism, drew the insights from the communitarian critique of liberalism while preserving liberalism's essential characteristics. However, the thesis will seek to argue that even the updated liberalism of political liberalism is indeed undesirably individualistic, but not in the way the communitarian criticisms of the 1980s and 90s alleged. Focusing on John Rawls - an emblematic contemporary liberal - for the sake of simplicity and clarity, the thesis will first establish whether justice as fairness is individualistic, distinguishing between three kinds of individualism. It will argue that Rawls is committed to 'moral individualism'. It will then argue that his moral individualism leads Rawls to two further types of individualism, which I term 'procedural individualism' and 'sovereign individualism'. The thesis will then press three objections to Rawls' procedural and sovereign individualism using recent work on political liberalism. The three lines of criticism are united by their objection to Rawls' attempt to leave individuals as free as possible to hold their own view of the good and pursue their own projects. The first questions whether the shared commitments of the members of a Rawlsian polity would be strong enough to maintain the social unity and stability Rawls himself emphasises is so important for justice as fairness to succeed. The second suggests that justice as fairness, in seeking to maximise the freedom of individuals to pursue their own interests, would encourage the kind of individualistic dispositions Rawls explicitly tries to avoid. And the third suggests that Rawls' desire to respect individual autonomy, and consequent wariness of state intervention in the lives of individuals, actually disrespects citizens by failing to use the resources of the state in ways that promote their good.

它将通过借鉴最近的文献，政治社区和公民友谊的性质，政治制度塑造公民的方式，以及国家中立和完美主义。对自由主义在个人主义方面存在问题的批评由来已久。然而，这种批评在过去20年里几乎没有什么吸引力。我认为，这主要是因为自由主义者如罗尔斯（在他的政治转向之后）和威尔·金利卡（Will Kymlicka），在回应这种批评时，从社群主义对自由主义的批判中汲取了见解，同时保留了自由主义的本质特征。然而，本文试图论证，即使是政治自由主义的最新自由主义也确实是不受欢迎的个人主义，但不是20世纪80年代和90年代的社群主义批评所声称的那样。为了简单明了起见，本文将重点放在约翰·罗尔斯（John Rawls）--当代自由主义的象征--身上，首先确定正义作为公平是否是个人主义的，区分三种个人主义。它将论证罗尔斯致力于“道德个人主义”。然后，本文将论证，罗尔斯的道德个人主义将他引向两种更进一步的个人主义，我称之为“程序个人主义”和“主权个人主义”。然后，本文将利用最近关于政治自由主义的研究成果，对罗尔斯的程序和主权个人主义提出三点反对意见。这三条批评路线是统一的，因为它们反对罗尔斯试图让个人尽可能自由地持有自己的善的观点并追求自己的项目。第一个问题是，罗尔斯政体成员的共同承诺是否足够强大，足以维持罗尔斯本人所强调的社会团结和稳定，这对正义和公平的成功至关重要。第二种观点认为，作为公平的正义在寻求个人追求自身利益的自由最大化时，会鼓励罗尔斯明确试图避免的那种个人主义倾向。第三点则表明，罗尔斯尊重个人自主的愿望，以及随之而来的对国家干预个人生活的谨慎态度，实际上是对公民的不尊重，因为他没有以促进公民利益的方式使用国家资源。