Critically assessing the 2008 UK financial crisis through the lens of policy, regulatory and state capture

从政策、监管和国家捕获的角度批判性评估 2008 年英国金融危机

• 批准号: 2113081
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Nottingham
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2018 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2113081
• 关键词: Critically; assessing; 2008; UK; financial

Almost a decade ago the UK banking system narrowly avoided a complete collapse. Without last minute intervention from the UK Government it was anticipated that the UK economy would face a long and protracted depression. Since then there have been a range of explanations for how these events came about, most of which include central bankers, regulators and governments who either failed to see the impending disaster or were dissuaded from taking pre-emptive action to avoid it.What has been examined in less detail is what caused this inertia.Within official reports on the crisis in the US and UK are the suggestion that inaction by regulators and central banks was caused by a political philosophy that discouraged unpopular interventions from state institutions into what had been a booming economy. This theory was summarised by one witness to a UK Parliamentary committee as the "universal capture of the regulators and the political process by the financial sector". Similar allegations could be levelled at the policy responses to the crisis, in particular quantitative easing and the nationalisation of key banks (some subsequently sold at sub-market rates) that were considered 'too big to fail'.The underlying hypothesis of the claims made above is that policy capture by a dominant pro-banking sector ideology narrowed the perceived options available to key decision-makers, which led to sub-optimal policy outcomes. The proposed research will critically examine this hypothesis and assess how far the empirical evidence supports competing theoretical explanations of the crash. This study will seek to answer the following questions:- To what extent did state, regulatory and/or policy capture lead to the financial crash of 2008 and determine subsequent policy responses from the UK Government, Parliament, regulators and Bank of England?- How, if at all, could this capture have been avoided?- What, if anything, has been done to prevent similar capture from happening in the future?The project will seek to further knowledge by:- Developing an operable definition of capture: through a thorough critical engagement with existing literature and consultation with expert academics in this field, the research will produce a robust and relevant definition of capture that can be operationalised for the project. Specifically, this will critically evaluate the utility of different definitions of capture - policy, regulatory and state - for the purpose of the research.- Elite interviews and analysis of relevant primary and secondary source material: through in-depth interviews with politicians, regulators and civil servants involved in the events preceding and following the financial crisis of 2008, the research will seek an elite perspective on the causes and responses to the financial crisis.This will aim to explore commonalities and differences in elite perspectives on the cause of the financial crisis, provide unique insights into the decision-making process surrounding the policy responses to it, and test elite responses to the proposition that capture is a plausible explanation for events leading up, and subsequent, to the crisis. The research will be underpinned by a close analysis of relevant documentary material and reports.Cutting-edge analysis of available proxies for capture: existing research into capture has focussed heavily on one or two variables that are insufficient to provide an all-encompassing analysis of capture, for example, the intensity of lobbying by specific industry groups on key decision-makers. Using new and previously unpublished data, the research will seek to provide a comprehensive analysis of proxies for capture across the institutions and actors relevant to the policy area under investigation.

近10年前，英国银行体系勉强避免了彻底崩溃。如果没有英国政府的最后干预，预计英国经济将面临长期和持久的萧条。从那时起，人们对这些事件的发生有一系列的解释，其中大多数包括央行行长，监管机构和政府要么没有看到即将到来的灾难，要么被劝阻采取预防措施，采取先发制人的行动来避免这种情况。人们对这种惯性的原因进行了较不详细的研究。在有关美国和英国危机的官方报告中，有人暗示监管机构和央行的不作为是由一种政治哲学引起的，这种政治哲学不鼓励国家机构对繁荣的经济进行不受欢迎的干预。英国议会一个委员会的一位证人将这一理论概括为“金融业对监管机构和政治程序的普遍俘获”。对危机的政策反应，尤其是量化宽松和国有化主要银行，也可能遭到类似的指责（一些随后以低于市场的价格出售），这些公司被认为“太大而不能倒闭”。上述主张的基本假设是，占主导地位的亲银行业意识形态的政策捕获缩小了关键决策者的可选择范围，这导致了次优的政策结果。拟议的研究将批判性地检验这一假设，并评估经验证据在多大程度上支持对坠机的相互竞争的理论解释。这项研究将寻求回答以下问题：-在何种程度上国家，监管和/或政策捕获导致2008年的金融危机，并确定随后的政策反应，从英国政府，议会，监管机构和英格兰银行？如果有的话，如何才能避免这次被俘？-为了防止今后发生类似的捕获事件，已经采取了哪些措施？该项目将通过以下方式寻求进一步的知识：-制定一个可操作的捕获定义：通过对现有文献的全面批判性参与和与该领域专家学者的协商，研究将产生一个强大的和相关的捕获定义，可以为该项目操作。具体来说，这将批判性地评估捕获的不同定义的效用-政策，监管和国家-为了研究的目的。精英访谈和相关主要和次要来源材料的分析：通过深入访谈参与2008年金融危机前后事件的政治家、监管机构和公务员，研究将寻求精英对金融危机原因和应对措施的看法。这将旨在探讨精英对金融危机原因的共同点和差异，提供独特的见解，围绕它的政策反应的决策过程，并测试精英的反应，捕捉是一个合理的解释，导致事件的命题，并随后，危机。对获取的现有代理的尖端分析：现有的获取研究主要集中在一个或两个变量上，这些变量不足以提供对获取的全面分析，例如，特定行业团体对关键决策者的游说强度。利用新的和以前未公布的数据，研究将寻求提供一个全面的分析代理捕获跨机构和行为体相关的政策领域的调查。