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Political Economy of State Capacity

Political Economy of State Capacity
国家能力的政治经济学
批准号:
2260306
负责人:
金额:
$0.0万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
英国
项目类别:
Studentship
财政年份:
2019
资助国家:
英国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2019 至 --

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中文摘要
翻译
当国家试图增加其能力时,社会在政治上会有什么反应?本论文提出了三个实验研究,揭示了这个问题,通过检查微观行为的后果,这样的国家能力的增加。第一篇文章探讨了将税收下放给地方精英(如刚果民主共和国的城市酋长)如何影响公民对国家和酋长问责的要求。它检查了从卡南加市的一项随机对照试验中收集的数据,在该试验中,社区被分配给州或首席税务征收,公民有一个集体行动的机会,通过公民会议的要求,让两者都承担责任。结果表明,将税收下放给地方精英并不妨碍公民让酋长和国家对政策结果负责的能力或意愿。第二篇文章问的是,当政治职位候选人承诺打击腐败而不是促进经济增长时,是否会产生选举成本。这项研究利用了在印度和英国进行的两项联合实验的证据,受访者可以在不同的假设候选人之间进行选择,这些候选人在沿着多个维度变化。结果表明,与承诺改善经济相比,承诺打击腐败作为中央政策平台可能会受到选民的选举惩罚。第三篇文章调查了自下而上的问责压力,以应对指定税收用于特定的公共支出。在加纳进行的一项在线调查实验中,它利用了公民对指定用途做法普遍程度的不同看法。理论分析表明,指定收入用途会抑制公民参与政治的积极性,从而产生不利的问责效果。总体而言,本文为国家与社会关系和国家能力的政治经济学研究提供了原始数据和新证据以及新的理论框架。
英文摘要
How does society react politically when the state tries to increase its capacity? This thesis presents three experimental studies that shed light on this question by examining the micro-behavioral consequences of such increases in state capacity. The first article explores how delegating tax collection to local elites such as city chiefs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo affects citizen demand for accountability, both from the state and the chiefs. It examines data collected from a randomized controlled trial in the city of Kananga where neighborhoods were assigned to either state or chief tax collection, and citizens had a collective action opportunity to hold both accountable through the request of citizen meetings. The results show that delegating tax collection to local elites does not impede citizens' ability or willingness to hold both chiefs and the state accountable for policy outcomes. The second article asks whether there are electoral costs associated when candidates for political office promise to fight corruption instead of improving economic growth. The study draws on evidence from two conjoint experiments conducted in India and the United Kingdom, where respondents could choose between different hypothetical candidates who varied along multiple dimensions. The results suggest that promising to fight corruption as a central policy platform may be electorally punished by voters compared to promising to improve the economy. The third article investigates the bottom-up accountability pressures in response to earmarking tax revenue for particular public expenditures. It does so by leveraging variation in the extent of citizens' beliefs about the prevalence of earmarking in an online survey experiment to be conducted in Ghana. Theoretical analysis shows that earmarking revenue can have adverse accountability effects by dampening citizens' incentives to engage in politics. Overall, this thesis contributes original data and novel evidence as well as new theoretical frameworks to the study of state-society relations and the political economy of state capacity.
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