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Information Asymmetry and Inequalities in Macroeconomics

宏观经济学中的信息不对称和不平等

基本信息

批准号：
2271629
负责人：
金额：
--
依托单位：
University of Warwick
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Studentship
财政年份：
2019
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2019 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2271629
关键词：
Information Asymmetry Inequalities Macroeconomics

项目摘要

Information has a fundamental role in determining individual choices: while each action is made conditional on the available information, this is potentially heterogeneous across individuals despite the existence of a common state of the world. When information is asymmetric non only across similar individuals, but also across different groups (similar individuals of the same "type"), who knows what matters not only at individual level, but can also affect the economy as a whole by modifying the aggregate consumption and saving behaviour, so that information inequalities "matters for macroeconomics".In this project, I explore how information asymmetries about the future dynamics of the economy can persist in equilibrium even when agents are fully rational and can observe all prices, amplifying the effects of the business cycle or even generating it. The contribution is to pin down a new mechanism of business cycle generation and amplification relying on information differentials but not on behavioural assumptions. Furthermore, I address the implications for conventional and unconventional policy-making arising from considering the beliefs-coordination mechanism of policy intervention.In fact, the implications of this mechanism are multifold. The business cycle is affected in non-trivial ways as agents are less able to understand how current prices reflect the underlying state of the world. First, this can affect various dimensions of ex-post and observable inequalities (e.g. wealth and education choices). Second, it creates a dilemma regarding the fiscal and monetary policy intervention: is revealing private information of the policy-maker optimal if "announcing" can lead to uncoordinated reactions across different individuals due to their different ex-ante information? "Simpler" policy instruments may be more effective than the apparently "optimal" ones when their ability to pin down similar beliefs across all agents - and thus coordinated reactions - is considered. Third, when information heterogeneity "matters for macro", individual information-acquisition choices lead to economic externalities. When this happens, the planner/policy-maker should address the issue by internalizing the externalities induced by individually optimal but potentially socially sub-optimal information acquisition choices.

信息在决定个人选择方面发挥着根本作用：虽然每个行动都取决于可用的信息，但尽管存在共同的世界状态，但这在个人之间可能是异质的。当信息不仅在相似个体之间不对称，而且在不同群体之间不对称时，（相同“类型”的相似个体），他们知道什么不仅在个人层面上重要，而且还可以通过改变总消费和储蓄行为来影响整个经济，因此信息不平等“对宏观经济学很重要”。在这个项目中，我探讨了经济未来动态的信息不对称如何在均衡中持续存在，即使代理人是完全理性的，可以观察到所有的价格，本文的贡献在于，通过对经济周期的分析，提出了一种新的经济周期生成和放大机制，信息差异，而不是行为假设。此外，我还讨论了政策干预的信念协调机制对传统和非传统政策制定的影响。商业周期受到了重要的影响，因为代理人不太能够理解当前价格如何反映世界的基本状况。首先，这可能影响到事后和可观察到的不平等的各个方面（例如财富和教育选择）。第二，它造成了一个两难的财政和货币政策干预：是披露政策制定者的私人信息是最优的，如果“宣布”可能会导致不协调的反应在不同的个体，由于他们不同的事前信息？“更简单”的政策工具可能比表面上“最佳”的政策工具更有效，因为它们能够在所有行为体中确定类似的信念--从而协调反应。第三，当信息异质性“对宏观经济有影响”时，个人信息获取选择会导致经济外部性。当这种情况发生时，规划者/决策者应该通过内化由个人最优但潜在的社会次优信息获取选择引起的外部性来解决这个问题。