Multinationals and Tax Justice

跨国公司和税收正义

• 批准号: 2432827
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Loughborough University
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2020 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2432827
• 关键词: Multinationals; Tax; Justice

Tax justice is probably one of the most controversial debates in economics over the costs and benefits of the continuous worldwide "arms race" regarding tax policies. In the past few decades the view that has dominated economic policy making is that sustainable economic growth can only come through a welcoming business environment. Specifically, this environment is one generally described by lax tax laws combined with subsidies or other financial incentives that when a multinational considers where to establish its new regional headquarters or new production line, may tilt the scale towards country "x" instead of country "y". While the first wave of countries which initially deregulated their economies and enforced such business friendly laws enjoyed considerable returns from these policy initiatives, it was not long until other economies followed their example. At the beginning there was intense competition with regards to which country provides the most appealing mix of low taxes or exemptions and subsidies to attract physical capital (or FDI). However, more recently governments across the globe are competing mostly in terms of the location where multinationals choose to report profits that are generated throughout their global supply chains. Thus, the prize is now tax revenue rather than physical investment. Multinationals on the other hand are applying "aggressive tax planning" techniques, such as profit shifting between countries, so that they can maximise their profits by making use of the global nexus of tax laws and regulations available to them. This balance has led to the erosion of national tax bases on many occasions and has negatively impacted public spending levels worldwide. These facts have triggered a debate on the pros and cons of such policies and whether this kind of competition still makes sense as an effective economic policy tool. Should governments continue to compete in attracting multinationals regardless of the trajectory of their tax revenues? Does increased employment or growth compensate for the cost such policies? Is this a race to the bottom? How do a firm's characteristics influence the likelihood that it will engage in "aggressive tax planning"? How is a firm's decision over the location of its production and HQ affected by new forms of tax competition? Are policies aimed at tackling "aggressive tax planning" (e.g. the OECD's recent proposal for a global minimum corporate tax rate) likely to do more harm than good? Given the market power of large MNEs, how might tax rules be shaped by firm-policymaker negotiations and lobbying? These are only a few questions requiring detailed, evidence-based answers and insights on what the contributions of citizens and businesses are and should be in an economy and whether a global tax policy coordination is required.

税收正义可能是经济学中最有争议的辩论之一，涉及全球持续的税收政策“军备竞赛”的成本和收益。在过去几十年里，主导经济政策制定的观点是，可持续的经济增长只能通过一个友好的商业环境来实现。具体而言，这种环境通常被描述为宽松的税法加上补贴或其他财政激励措施，当跨国公司考虑在哪里建立新的地区总部或新的生产线时，可能会将规模倾斜到“x”国而不是“y”国。第一批国家最初放松了对经济的管制，并实施了有利于商业的法律，这些国家从这些政策举措中获得了可观的回报，但不久之后，其他经济体也纷纷效仿。在开始时，各国之间存在着激烈的竞争，要看哪个国家提供最有吸引力的低税收或免税和补贴的组合，以吸引实物资本（或外国直接投资）。然而，最近，地球仪各国政府的竞争主要是跨国公司选择报告其全球供应链产生的利润的地点。因此，现在的奖励是税收收入，而不是实物投资。另一方面，跨国公司正在采用“积极的税收规划”技术，例如在国家之间转移利润，以便通过利用可供其使用的全球税法和法规网络来最大限度地提高利润。这种平衡在许多情况下导致国家税基受到侵蚀，并对世界各地的公共支出水平产生了负面影响。这些事实引发了一场关于这些政策的利弊以及这种竞争作为有效的经济政策工具是否仍然有意义的辩论。政府是否应该继续竞争吸引跨国公司，而不管它们的税收收入如何？增加就业或经济增长是否弥补了这些政策的成本？这是一场逐底竞赛吗？企业的特征如何影响其进行“积极税收筹划”的可能性？新形式的税收竞争如何影响公司对其生产和总部所在地的决定？旨在解决“激进的税收规划”的政策（例如经合组织最近提出的全球最低公司税率）是否可能弊大于利？考虑到大型跨国企业的市场力量，企业与政策制定者的谈判和游说可能如何塑造税收规则？这些只是一些需要详细的、基于证据的答案和见解的问题，这些问题涉及公民和企业在经济中的贡献以及是否需要全球税收政策协调。