Multinationals and Tax Justice

税收正义可能是经济学中最具争议性的辩论之一，争论的焦点是关于税收政策的持续的全球“军备竞赛”的代价和好处。在过去的几十年里，主导经济政策制定的观点是，可持续的经济增长只能通过一个友好的商业环境来实现。具体地说，这种环境通常由宽松的税法结合补贴或其他财政激励措施来描述，当跨国公司考虑在哪里建立新的地区总部或新的生产线时，可能会使规模向“x”国倾斜，而不是“y”国。虽然第一批最初放松经济管制并执行此类有利于商业的法律的国家从这些政策举措中获得了可观的回报，但没过多久，其他经济体就效仿了它们。起初，在哪个国家提供最有吸引力的低税收或免税和补贴组合以吸引实物资本(或外国直接投资)的问题上存在激烈的竞争。然而，最近，全球各国政府主要是在跨国公司选择报告其全球供应链产生的利润的地点方面展开竞争。因此，现在的奖品是税收，而不是实物投资。另一方面，跨国公司正在应用“激进的税收筹划”技术，比如在不同国家之间转移利润，这样它们就可以通过利用它们可以利用的全球税收法律和法规网络，实现利润最大化。这种平衡在许多情况下导致国家税基的侵蚀，并对全世界的公共支出水平产生了负面影响。这些事实引发了一场关于此类政策的利弊以及这种竞争作为一种有效的经济政策工具是否仍然有意义的辩论。各国政府是否应该继续在吸引跨国公司方面展开竞争，而不管它们的税收收入轨迹如何？就业增加或经济增长是否弥补了此类政策的成本？这是一场逐底竞赛吗？一家公司的特点如何影响它进行“积极的税务筹划”的可能性？新形式的税收竞争如何影响一家公司关于其生产和总部所在地的决定？旨在解决“激进税收计划”(例如，经合组织最近提出的全球最低企业税率)的政策是否可能弊大于利？考虑到大型跨国公司的市场力量，企业与政策制定者之间的谈判和游说会如何影响税收规则？这些只是几个问题，需要详细的、基于证据的答案和洞察，关于公民和企业在一个经济体中的贡献是什么，应该是什么，以及是否需要全球税收政策协调。

Tax justice is probably one of the most controversial debates in economics over the costs and benefits of the continuous worldwide "arms race" regarding tax policies. In the past few decades the view that has dominated economic policy making is that sustainable economic growth can only come through a welcoming business environment. Specifically, this environment is one generally described by lax tax laws combined with subsidies or other financial incentives that when a multinational considers where to establish its new regional headquarters or new production line, may tilt the scale towards country "x" instead of country "y". While the first wave of countries which initially deregulated their economies and enforced such business friendly laws enjoyed considerable returns from these policy initiatives, it was not long until other economies followed their example. At the beginning there was intense competition with regards to which country provides the most appealing mix of low taxes or exemptions and subsidies to attract physical capital (or FDI). However, more recently governments across the globe are competing mostly in terms of the location where multinationals choose to report profits that are generated throughout their global supply chains. Thus, the prize is now tax revenue rather than physical investment. Multinationals on the other hand are applying "aggressive tax planning" techniques, such as profit shifting between countries, so that they can maximise their profits by making use of the global nexus of tax laws and regulations available to them. This balance has led to the erosion of national tax bases on many occasions and has negatively impacted public spending levels worldwide. These facts have triggered a debate on the pros and cons of such policies and whether this kind of competition still makes sense as an effective economic policy tool. Should governments continue to compete in attracting multinationals regardless of the trajectory of their tax revenues? Does increased employment or growth compensate for the cost such policies? Is this a race to the bottom? How do a firm's characteristics influence the likelihood that it will engage in "aggressive tax planning"? How is a firm's decision over the location of its production and HQ affected by new forms of tax competition? Are policies aimed at tackling "aggressive tax planning" (e.g. the OECD's recent proposal for a global minimum corporate tax rate) likely to do more harm than good? Given the market power of large MNEs, how might tax rules be shaped by firm-policymaker negotiations and lobbying? These are only a few questions requiring detailed, evidence-based answers and insights on what the contributions of citizens and businesses are and should be in an economy and whether a global tax policy coordination is required.